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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
‘Regulation’ denotes the establishment of rules relating to a particular industry.1 It has also 
been defined as a set of binding rules issued by a private or public body.2 Therefore, financial 
regulation is a network of rules that governs the conduct of participants in the financial 
system.3 The economic theory giving birth to the concept of regulation was first published in 
1971 through Stigler’s theory.4  
In his Theory of Economic Regulation two schools of thought are advanced, namely, positive 
theories and normative theories of regulation.5 Economic theory further suggests that the 
three main reasons for regulation are to constrain the use of monopoly in a bid to prevent 
serious distortions to competition and maintain market integrity; to safeguard the needs of 
ordinary people; and lastly that the social and overall costs of market failure exceed private 
costs of failure and the extra cost of regulation.6 
The issue of market failure is cardinal to any discussion on financial regulation and 
supervision. In fact, it has been authoritatively stated that ‘regulation is only necessary to the 
extent that markets may fail, and then only where it can be demonstrated that the benefits of 
intervention outweigh its costs.’ 7 
Consequently, it can be argued that the two pillars of the concept of financial regulation 
which are to mitigate the problem of systemic risk and regulate the conduct of business 
                                                            
1
 Botha E & Makina D ‘Financial Regulation and Supervision: Theory and Practice in South Africa’ (2011) 
International Business and Economics Research Journal 10 (11) 27 (hereinafter Botha  &Makina (2011)). 
2
 Mwenda K Legal Aspects of Financial Services Regulation and the concept of a Unified Regulator (2006) 
(hereinafter Mwenda  (2006). 
3
 Carmichael J & Pomerleano M The Development and Regulation of Non-Bank Financial Institutions (2002) 21. 
4
 Peltzman S ‘Towards a more General Theory of Regulation’ (1976) Journal of Law and Economics 19(2) 211 
[accessed 4 November 2014 at http://raptor1.bizlab.mtsu.edu/S-
Drive/CKLEIN/ECON%207121/Micro%20III%20Papers/References/Peltzman%281976%29.pdf ] (hereinafter 
Peltzman (1976). 
5
 Botha E & Makina D (2011) 28. 
6
 International Centre for Monetary and Banking Studies Geneva Reports on the World Economy 11 
Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation (2009) 20. 
7
 O’Brien J, Gilligan G & Miller  S ‘Culture and future of financial regulation: how to embed restraint in the 
interests of systemic stability’ (2014 ) Law & Financial Markets Review 8 (2) 115 117. 
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emerge at the point where the market fails. 8 Furthermore, financial regulation exists on two 
levels, namely, the micro-prudential level which focuses on the various financial institutions 
and is thus ‘institutional’, and the macro-prudential level which focuses on the stability of the 
whole financial system and is thus ‘systemic’.9 
Countries either adopt a Unified Regulatory Model, with partial or full unification, an 
Integrated Model, a Twin Peaks Model or a Silos Model with separate financial services 
authorities for each segment of the financial sector.10 These are what this study refers to as 
the primary models of financial services regulation. 
Loosely put, the Unification Model has one ‘umbrella’ regulator and supervisor dealing with 
prudential and conduct of business aspects of the financial sector. It can be fully or partially 
unified, partial unification is a breakaway from the single regulator with one or two sectors 
separated from the central hub. The Integrated model is a close cousin to the Unification 
Model with the main distinction being that it only focuses on prudential regulation.11 
The Twin Peaks Model has only two agencies- one for prudential (systemic) regulation and 
the other for conduct of business regulation.12 Prudential regulation deals with the safety and 
soundness of financial institutions and the sector as a whole, whilst conduct of business looks 
into consumer protection. The self-explanatory name of the Silos Model is that each segment 
of the financial sector has its own ‘separate’ regulatory and supervisory agency. 
1.2 FOUNDATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The concept of a harmonised method of financial services regulation and supervision in the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) stems from SADC’s objective to 
integrate to a monetary union by 2018.13 The underlying legal undertaking for this 
                                                            
8
 Davies H & Green D Global Financial Regulation: The Essential Guide (2008) Polity Press 15-22 
9
 International Centre for Monetary and Banking Studies Geneva Reports on the World Economy 11 
Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation (2009) 20; O’Brien J, Gilligan G & Miller  S ‘Culture and future of 
financial regulation: how to embed restraint in the interests of systemic stability’ (2014 ) Law & Financial 
Markets Review 8 (2) 115. 
10
 Llewellyn DT Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation and Supervision: The Basic Issues, Paper 
presented at a World Bank seminar on Aligning Supervisory Structures with Country Needs, Washington DC, 6th 
and 7th June, 2006 accessed at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTOPCONF6/Resources/2057292-
1162909660809/F2FlemmingLlewellyn.pdf on 23rd August 2014 (hereinafter Llewellyn DT Institutional 
Structure of Financial Regulation and Supervision: The Basic Issues (2006)). 
11
 Llewellyn DT Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation and Supervision: The Basic Issues (2006) 3. 
12
 De Jager J ‘South African Reserve Bank: Blowing Winds of Change (Part 2)’ (2013) 25 South African 
Mercantile Law Journal 492 507. 
13
 Belle M ‘Regional Economic Integration in SADC: progress, prospects and statistical issues for monetary 
union’ Proceedings of the Irving Fisher Committee Seminar on “Economic and Financial Convergence en Route 
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‘philosophy’ is found in Article 5 of the SADC Treaty as read and substantiated with Article 
23 of SADC’s Trade Protocol and the SADC Finance and Investment Protocol which sets out 
a timeline.14 
Saurombe15 analyses SADC’s development oriented and globally relevant regional 
integration timeline. He outlines that SADC’s transformation entails a Free Trade Area 
(FTA) in 2008, a Customs Union in 2010, a Common Market in 2015 and ultimately a 
Monetary Union in 2018. In his assessment, the set goals are unattainable and are ‘a 
farfetched dream’. He posits that the biggest hurdle is the SADC institutional framework 
which he submits was not correctly reformed during the evolution of SADC from SADCC 
(Southern African Development Coordination Conference). 
Although Saurombe appears to be a prophet of doom, he does not discredit the idea of a 
monetary union entirely but merely highlights the problems SADC may face in such pursuit. 
One is therefore inclined to agree with his submissions in as far as they map out the 
challenges that need to be addressed in the regional integration pursuit and the attainment of 
such in the set timeframe. However, the author doesn’t support his assertion and 
classification of SADC’s endeavours as ‘a far fetched dream’. The challenges facing SADC 
are not insurmountable and can be conquered by well structured policies coupled with an 
overarching political will by the SADC member states. Over and above his reservations, a 
prerequisite to a monetary union is that there should be uniform standards of financial sector 
regulation and supervision which ultimately culminate in a robust financial system protected 
by common prudential rules.16 
Moreover, the African Union (AU) together with the African Economic Community have 
adopted a six-stage approach which aims to financially integrate Africa to the point of having 
a single currency by 2028.17  It has been correctly submitted that in order to achieve this, 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
to Regional Economic Integration: Experience, Prospects and Statistical Issues amidst Global Financial 
Turmoil”. Durban, South Africa (2010) accessed at http://www.bis.org/ifc/publ/ifcb32e.pdf 8th October 2014.; 
Saurombe A ‘Regional Integration Agenda for SADC “Caught in the winds of change” Problems and Prospects’ 
(2009) 4(2) Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology 100 103. 
14
 Nkowani Z ‘The SADC Finance and Investment Protocol and the Reform of the Malawian Financial Services 
Regulatory Framework: Reflections in Retrospect’ (2009) (3)(1) Malawian Law Journal 7. 
15
 Saurombe A ‘Regional Integration Agenda for SADC “Caught in the winds of change” Problems and 
Prospects’ (2009) 4(2) Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology 100. 
16
 Jefferis KR ‘The Process of Monetary Integration in the SADC region’ (2007) 33(1) Journal of Southern African 
Studies 83 89 (hereinafter Jeffries 2007). 
17
 Article 6(2) Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, (1999) 30 ILM 1241;  Rossouw J ‘An 
Analysis of Macro-economic Convergence in SADC’ (2006) 74(3) South African Journal of Economics 382 383. 
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African financial integration must adopt a bottom-up approach: wherein financial 
harmonisation will commence at the regional economic communities level and ripple into the 
rest of Africa.18 
One such regional economic community is SADC. It has been described as a region with 
diverse economies ranging from one of Africa biggest economies (South Africa) to some of 
the smallest and arguably poorest economies in Africa (Lesotho and Swaziland).19 It is 
inevitable, as a result, that the idea of adopting one model of financial services regulation and 
supervision within such a spectrum will pose a challenge.  
This has already been observed with the on-going attempts at cross-border banking 
supervision which is an important factor in the current regulatory and supervisory reform 
agenda of the Southern African financial sector. 20 Cabello, Hands, Grossman and Hayes 
reveal that the unfortunate set-back resulting from these attempts is the critical disparity in 
the financial systems of the SADC Member States, with South Africa and Mauritius having 
highly developed banking systems when compared to Democratic Republic of Congo and 
Zimbabwe. 21   
Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, since banks involved in cross-border banking 
operations in the SADC region originate from different regulatory systems, this makes it 
difficult to effectively and expediently perform transactions. It is evident that the introduction 
of a legally enforceable regulatory and supervisory system is incontrovertible not only in the 
banking industry as highlighted above but in the financial services sector as a whole.  
Although Cabello, Hands, Grossman and Hayes underscore all the complexities and 
challenges faced in cross border banking, they fall short of recommending a regional 
regulatory and supervisory system should be in place. 
                                                            
18
 Salami I ‘Financial Regulation in African frontier markets: can the EU approach work?’ 2011 Law and 
Financial Markets Review 380 381. 
19
 Governance of Financial Institutions in Southern Africa: Issues for an Institutional Convergence Framework 
for Regional Financial Integration in SADC (published in ECA-SA/TBUP/GOV/2009/3) accessed 1 September 
2014 at 
www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/govoffininstinsouthernafrica_issuesforrfiframework_final.
pdf  
20
 Cabello M, Hands R, Grossman J, & Hayes J ‘Cross Border Banking Supervision in SADC Region’ (2013) 4(2) 
Applied Capital Markets-Insight 36. 
21
 Cabello M, Hands R, Grossman J, & Hayes J ‘Cross Border Banking Supervision in SADC Region’ (2013) 4(2) 
Applied Capital Markets-Insight 36. 
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It would be incorrect to suggest that no work has been done in SADC towards the idea of a 
regional regulator and supervisor. In fact, certain strides have been made by the SADC 
Committee of Central Bank Governors (CCBG) and the SADC Subcommittee of Banking 
Supervisors (SSBS) by signing the Finance and Investment Protocol (FIP) of 2010. This 
Protocol has led to the formulation of the SADC Model Central Bank Law which addresses 
financial regulation and supervision in its Chapter VI. 
In more relative terms, SADC’s FIP is geared to encourage financial integration at different 
levels. Crucial to this are Article 10 and 12 which deal with banking regulation, and 
regulation of insurance, securities and non-banking financial institutions respectively.22  
Although no express mention is made in the FIP of the formation of one financial services 
regulator and/or supervisor for the whole SADC, it does highlight the ‘need to go towards the 
harmonisation of their respective laws and regulations and regulatory and supervisory 
practices with the aim of preventing or reducing regulatory arbitrage.’23 
Monetary Unions by their very nature demand ‘high and preferably uniform standards of 
financial services supervision.’24 Therefore, despite no specific mention of one model of 
financial services regulation and supervision in the SADC FIP, the existence of such is an 
inevitable step for the region in its path to becoming a Monetary Union by 2018 and a party 
to the evolution of an African Monetary Union. 
Therefore, undertaking to have a Monetary Union too quickly without considering all the pre-
requisites could prove to be detrimental to both SADC and Africa as a whole. One of the pre-
requisites identified is the need for common prudential rules and supervision which could be 
a regional financial services regulator and supervisor.25  
Financial services regulation must be understood as existing in four phases. At the one end of 
the spectrum there is no regulation, on the other end there is statutory regulation, where 
regulations are specified, administered and enforced by the state.26  Between the two 
                                                            
22
 Article 10 of the SADC Financial and Investment Protocol as read with Annex 8 sub Art 2(1) (b) and (d) whilst 
Article 12 is read with Annex 10 sub Art 9. 
23
 Annex 10 sub Art 9  FIP. 
24
 Jefferis KR (2007) 91. 
25
 Jefferis KR (2007) 89. 
26
 Sanders D ‘Reinventing regulation’ (June 2014) Law and Financial Markets Review 98 99.  
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extremes lies the idea of self regulation and co-regulation where financial services regulation 
and supervision can be categorised by institution, function or by objectives.27  
It is within the realm of these three categories that the abovementioned ‘models’ of financial 
services regulation are conceived. Therein, regulations are often issued by the state and/or the 
regulated organisations and enforced in a similar fashion.28  
However, it must be noted that different computations tailored for various countries have 
emerged from these primary models. For example within the Unification Model it may be 
unification in the central bank or outside the central bank.29  
Botswana embraced a partial Unification  Model in 2008 stemming from the government’s 
adoption of the Carmichael Report30, with one agency regulating and supervising all non-
bank financial institutions (NBFIs) on the one hand, and the Bank of Botswana being the 
central bank regulating and supervising all banks, on the other. Generally, it has been stated 
that no particular model is better than the other and often countries adopt models tailored to 
suit their needs at a particular time. Factors, such as, the size of the country, structure of its 
financial sector and the political climate at the time, all contribute towards the matrix 
adopted.31 
This study explores the development of a financial services regulator and supervisor for 
SADC by examining the various legal issues that are related to the different models and 
potentially recommending one model to suit SADC’s circumstances. 
1.3 STATEMENT OF RESEARCH PROBLEM 
The main issue examined is whether the SADC’s aim to integrate financial services 
regulation is attainable, and which model would then be ideal for this proposed integration. 
This is done in the light of the various models of financial regulation that exist within the 
SADC Member States. 
                                                            
27
 Llewellyn DT Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation and Supervision: The Basic Issues, Paper 
presented at a World Bank seminar on Aligning Supervisory Structures with Country Needs, Washington DC, 6th 
and 7th June, 2006 accessed at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTOPCONF6/Resources/2057292-
1162909660809/F2FlemmingLlewellyn.pdf on 23rd August 2014. 
28
 Sanders D ‘Reinventing regulation’ (June 2014). 
29
 Mwenda K Legal Aspects of Financial Services Regulation and the concept of a Unified Regulator (2006) The 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank: Washington DC. 
30
 Carmichael J & Pomerleano M The Development and Regulation of Non-Bank Financial Institutions 
(The World Bank, Washington, DC 2002); Bojosi K ‘An appraisal of the new legal framework for the regulation 
of non-banking financial institutions in Botswana’(2012) 15 University of Botswana Law Journal 29. 
31
 Llewellyn DT Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation and Supervision: The Basic Issues (2006) 4. 
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For instance, whereas the Botswana government has recently adopted the Unification Model 
as outlined above, South Africa has moved away from this model to adopt the Twin Peaks 
Model which comprises of prudential regulation and conduct of business regulation.32 
Against this backdrop, a need arises first to examine the four primary models as outlined 
above. It is worth clarifying that although there are theoretically four primary models, the 
study only extensively discusses three as the fourth, being the Integrated Model is very 
similar to the Unification Model and requires no independent analysis. Thereafter, this study 
examines the various permutations and combinations to the said models adopted by several 
SADC Member States in order to make an informed recommendation, on which model of 
financial services regulation would be ideal and practical for a regional economic 
community, such as the SADC.  
Further, the study examines the impact that regional integration of financial services 
regulation in the SADC will have on the existing legal structures of the Member States. Since 
compatible or harmonised regulations are pivotal for the monetary union to become a 
reality33, will such harmonisation favour certain Member States at the expense of others?   
Undoubtedly, South Africa, being the largest economy in the SADC, often dictates the terms 
to be followed in any integration. This is can be seen by how the South African Trade 
Development Cooperation Agreement with the European Union (EU) has set the tune for 
SADC’s Economic and Partnership agreement with the EU.34 The mini-thesis examines, as a 
consequence, whether the adoption of the South African Twin Peaks Model is inevitable for 
all other Member States to enable them to reap the benefits of regional integration. 
                                                            
32
 KPMG Twin Peaks reports, South Africa accessed at: 
http://www.kpmg.com/ZA/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Financial-
Services/Documents/KPMG%20Twin%20peaks.pdf and United Kingdom accessed at: 
http://www.kpmg.com/ZA/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Financial-
Services/Documents/Twin%20Peaks%20Regulation%20Key%20Changes%20and%20Challenges%20-
%2019%20Oct%2012.pdf both accessed on the 23
 
August 2014. 
33
International Monetary Fund Working Paper (African and International Capital Markets Division), Regional 
Integration of Stock Exchanges in Eastern and Southern Africa: Progress and Prospects (June 2005) 12: where 
reference is made to the harmonisation of listing requirements for all SADC Member States.  
34
 ‘Southern African region and the EU complete negotiations for an Economic Partnership Agreement’ 
European Commission Press Release IP/14/872   22/07/2014, Brussels, 22 July 2014 available at  
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-872_en.htm [accessed 21 October 2014]; ‘The EU’s EPA 
negotiations with the Southern African Development Community (SADC): July 2014 update’ available at 
http://www.tralac.org/news/article/5907-the-eu-s-epa-negotiations-with-the-southern-african-development-
community-sadc-july-2014-update.html [accessed 22 October 2014]. 
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1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY 
In order for smaller countries to stay abreast of the process of global financial integration, 
resort has been taken to the formation of regional economic communities with the hope that a 
more solid contribution and participation in the global community will be achieved.35 The 
study therefore examines how SADC can deepen its integration levels in order for it to 
effectively benefit from the combined forces of being a regional cooperation arrangement. 
Moreover, the success of this study will enable SADC Member States to take a further step to 
achieve their Monetary Union goals under the auspices of the African Union and the African 
Economic Community.36 It is trite within the African context that improved participation of 
regional economic communities in the global arena will ultimately lead to increased and 
improved African participation as a whole.  
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTION AND OBJECTIVES  
The purpose of this research is to examine the legal and institutional framework of financial 
services supervision and regulation in SADC. In doing so the study will probe the various 
models of financial services regulation with the purpose of discerning what each model sets 
out to do and how, in doing so, it effectively exercises its function. 
This study answers the question: is there a model of financial services regulation and 
supervision that is legally sound and best embraces SADC’s circumstances? The legal 
soundness will be extracted by examining which model achieves the main objectives of 
independence and accountability to the greatest extent. 
The first objective of the study is to discuss the structure and operations of each of the 
identified primary models of financial services regulation with the aim of determining 
whether certain cardinal administrative law principles are upheld. 
Secondly, it then takes a practical look at how the primary models are applied and effectively 
work within some of the SADC Member States. Similarly, the study’s main focus will be to 
discern whether the financial services regulation models are ‘tangible’ when country 
dynamics are introduced.  
                                                            
35
 Regional trade and financial integration in the Southern African Development Community, Address by the 
then Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, Dr Chris Stals, at a meeting for business people arranged by 
the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe in Harare, Zimbabwe.(18 June 1999) accessed 1 September 2014 at 
http://www.bis.org/review/r990630a.pdf. 
36
 Articles 3(h), 4(1)(a), 4(1)(d) and 4(2) of the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, (1999) 30 
ILM 1241. 
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Thereafter, the study reconnoitres the possibility of SADC adopting a ‘harmonised’ financial 
services regulator and supervisor. It is worth noting that ideal as it may be; the author has no 
intention of prescribing one of the primary models but merely uses them as a springboard to 
ascertaining the viability of a single financial services regulator and supervisor in SADC. The 
objective is to assess how best SADC can deepen its integration levels in this area of concern. 
The ultimate result may very well be that such deeper relations are not feasible or that 
different components from the primary models be adopted to make SADC’s ‘unique’ model 
of financial services regulation and supervision. 
1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research aims to employ both primary and secondary sources. With the former this will 
mostly be legislation enacted in the SADC Member States for the purpose of regulation and 
supervision of financial services, the SADC Treaty and its various protocols and 
memorandums of agreement; the latter entails a plethora of academic material such as, 
journal articles, books, newspaper commentary together with presentations and/or reports 
made by various international organisations such as SADC and the World Bank.  
1.7 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter 2 examines the Unification Model of financial services regulation and supervision. It 
looks at both full unification and partial unification. Thereafter, it discusses some of the 
SADC Member States that have adopted the Unification Model. Malawi is the point of 
reference for full unification whereas Botswana will provide practical insight into partial 
unification. This is then followed by a scrutiny of the degree to which such model upholds 
independence and accountability. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the Twin Peaks Model. Herein, in the same way, the central 
components of the model are studied. This is followed by the South African example: a 
SADC member state that has adopted the Twin Peaks Model. Similarly, the question of 
optimum accountability and independence will be examined with reference to this model. 
Chapter 4 looks at Silos Model of financial services regulation. While discussing the central 
characteristics, this chapter will draw comparisons and distinctions between this model and 
the previously discussed models. After the requisite critique, Tanzania is then brought to the 
fore as the SADC Member State that has adopted the Silos Model approach of financial 
services regulation and supervision. Ultimately, in tune with the golden thread, the 
accountability and independence of these models are assessed. 
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Lastly, Chapter 5 contains what the author has termed the SADC Triple Peaks Model. This is 
a recommendation of a hybrid model, in light of the discussion, that best suits SADC’s 
circumstances and strives to effectively maintain accountability and independence. 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
THE UNIFICATION MODEL 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In examining whether one model can be recommended as a regional financial regulator in 
SADC one must first examine the four primary models as noted in Chapter 1. It must be 
emphasised that the four primary models that this research explores in the context of a SADC 
‘regional regulator’ are just different computations of the institutional and legal frameworks 
of a financial regulator.   
These primary models are: the Unification Model, with partial or full unification, its close 
cousin the Integrated Model, the Twin Peaks Model; and the Silos Model of financial 
services authorities.37 One of the distinguishing features that can directly be associated with 
the variations in regulatory models is whether they fall under the functional or institutional 
categorisation. With the former the focus is on the functions to regulate and supervise 
whereas that of the latter is on the institution responsible for such regulation and 
supervision.38 Although this distinction is illuminating as a means of understanding the 
primary models, Llewellyn insightfully notes that in reality it is institutions and not functions 
that fail and become insolvent. Despite these internal variations the root concept of a 
financial services regulation remains unchanged. 39 
This chapter examines the Unification Model of financial services regulation and supervision. 
It commences by looking at the general terminology and definitional components of the 
model, elaborating on how the model should theoretically work, and assessing its advantages 
                                                            
37
 Llewellyn DT Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation and Supervision: The Basic Issues (2006) 2. 
38
 Llewellyn DT Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation and Supervision: The Basic Issues (2006) 11. 
39
 Llewellyn DT Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation and Supervision: The Basic Issues (2006) 17 
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and disadvantages. There are two types of unification discussed herein: full and partial 
unification.  Full unification denotes a scenario where an agency regulates and supervises all 
the business activity of the entire financial sector40 whereas in partial unification a few 
segments of the financial sector are supervised by a single regulator such as, in the case of 
Zambia where pension funds and insurance companies have been grouped together.41 
 Following the introductory segment and a brief recap of the types of unification, the chapter 
delves into the country case studies that represent the two forms of the Unification Model: 
Malawi for the one end and Botswana for the other. The chapter is wrapped up by objectively 
assessing the independence and accountability of the said model. This independence and 
accountability analysis forms an integral part of the ultimate determination of which model 
best suits the SADC. 
2.2 What is the Unification Model? 
The Unification Model embodies the concept of a ‘single’ or ‘unified’ regulator which in its 
purest form there is one regulatory and supervisory agency for the entire financial sector. It is 
vital to note from the outset that, generally, the Unification Model is born from the functional 
categorisation of regulation and supervision: different functions are regulated and supervised 
irrespective of the institutions actively performing them.42 As a consequence, this would 
suggest that the Unification Model is the antithesis of the Silos Model (which falls under the 
institutional categorisation) and that the two are mutually exclusive.  
However, Mwenda makes a very interesting argument:  he submits that the two apparently 
dissimilar models can complement each other and in some instances co-exist.43In his opinion 
the ‘co-existence’ of the models can occur when within the Unification Model various 
departments are formed along institutional lines, for example, licensing would be separate 
from the pensions division, securities division, and insurance division, giving a semblance of 
a Silos Model within the Unification Model. 44This would be different from unification where 
licensing for all of the above (pensions, securities and insurance) is done by one department, 
for example, the Licensing Department. 
                                                            
40
 Mwenda ‘Legal Aspects’ 38. 
41
 Mwenda ‘Legal Aspects’ 38. 
42
 Llewellyn DT Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation and Supervision: The Basic Issues (2006) 11 
43
 Mwenda K Legal Aspects 10. 
44
 Mwenda K Legal Aspects 37. 
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Although the author treads carefully when inclined to differ with Professor Mwenda, his 
analysis is unfortunately not sustainable in this discussion. It is submitted that the 
departmental divisions are in pursuit of a cleaner, more refined, structured and organised 
manner of operation and in no way an attempt to merge the two models of financial services 
regulation and supervision as alleged. In the Silos Model fully discussed below in Chapter 4, 
the agencies are independent from each other, and the adoption of this model presupposes a 
clear demarcation between each of the financial services.45  
These clear cut boundaries are not envisioned in the Unification Model and in fact this model 
acknowledges that such differences are often blurred. Llewellyn favours the Unification 
Model by stating that ‘a regulatory system which presupposes a clear separation between 
banking, securities and insurance is no longer the best way to regulate a financial system in 
which these distinctions are increasingly irrelevant’.46 
Their differences momentarily aside, the Silos Model, often referred to as the traditional or 
vertical model, has in many instances been a precursor to the Unification Model. Canada, 
Denmark, South Africa and the United Kingdom are all examples of countries where the 
Unification Model was adopted in a bid to address the shortcomings of the Silos Model.47 It 
is believed that Norway was the first country to establish a single supervisor in 1986 before 
being followed by its other European counterparts, such as, the United Kingdom and 
Germany in 1997 and 2002, respectively.48 Despite its colourful and isolated history of 
apartheid the South African evolution also dates back to the 1980’s when the idea of a 
consolidated regulatory and supervisory structure was discussed also springing from 
separately regulated and supervised entities.49 
Another key distinction vital to an understanding of the Unification Model is its difference 
from the Integrated Model. Whereas the Integrated Model focuses only on prudential 
regulation of all financial firms, the Unification Model covers a wider range of prudential 
regulation and conduct of business regulation and supervision.50 Simply, the former deals 
                                                            
45
 Marsciandaro D & Quintyn M The Evolution of Financial Supervision: the Continuing Search for the Holy Grail 
SUERF’s 50
th
 Anniversary Volume Chapters (2013) 263 accessed 7 December 2014 at 
http://suerf.org/download/50ymf/50y_ch8.pdf (hereinafter Marsciandaro D & Quintyn M 2013). 
46
 Llewellyn DT Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation and Supervision: The Basic Issues (2006) 19. 
47
 Mwenda  Legal Aspects 10. 
48
 Marsciandaro D & Quintyn M 2013 277. 
49
 Botha E &Makina D ‘Financial Regulation and Supervision: Theory and Practice in South Africa’ (2011) 10(11) 
International Business and Economic Research Journal 27 32 (hereinafter Botha E & Makina D 2011). 
50
 Llewellyn DT Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation and Supervision: The Basic Issues (2006) 3 
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only with the aspect of ensuring stability of financial firms through protecting their safety and 
soundness51; whereas the latter encompasses this dimension together with the conduct facet 
which ensures the proper running of the market by monitoring issues,  such as,  market abuse 
and consumer protection.52  
2.3 Preconditions for establishing a unified regulator 
The overarching goal of the establishment of any regulator or supervisor, including one 
within the Unification Model is the development of regulatory capacity.53 Against this 
backdrop, the prerequisites or preconditions for the establishment of a unified regulator must 
be aligned with this paramount mandate or objective.  
Mwenda54 submits that some of the decisive factors for establishing a unified regulator are 
the following: sound and sustainable macroeconomic policies, the necessary political will of 
stakeholders, cooperation and sharing of information, skilled human capital, sufficient 
financial resources, and the existence of conglomerates and cross ownership inter alia. 
2.3.1 Sound and Sustainable Macroeconomic Policies 
Simply put, the establishment of a unified regulator must be the appropriate step correctly in 
line with the objectives of a country or, for our purposes region, as embodied in its 
macroeconomic policies.55 Although the leap to a unified regulator without first establishing 
solid macroeconomic policies may be seen as an effort to adopt international best practices or 
even gain market access to certain parts of the developed world, a solid macroeconomic 
policy is incontrovertible.56 If the Unification Model is to be considered for SADC then it is 
of vital importance that macroeconomic policies for the regional body be in place to 
accommodate the introduction of this phenomenon. An argument can be made that the SADC 
FIP together with the work done by the CCGB is strategically aligned with the ultimate goal 
                                                            
51
 The United Kingdom’s Prudential Regulatory Authority as part of the Bank of England established through 
the Financial Services Act of 2012 accessed at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Pages/default.aspx on 7 
December 2014. 
52
 The United Kingdom Financial Conduct Authority also established through the Financial Services Act of 2012 
accessed 7 December 2014  at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/21/part/2/crossheading/financial-
conduct-authority-and-prudential-regulation-authority/enacted is responsible ONLY for conduct of business 
regulation and supervision and serves as the second branch to UK’s Twin Peaks Model.  
53
 International Monetary Fund Working Paper, Issues in the Unification of Financial Sector Supervision 
(December 2000) 5. 
54
 Mwenda K Legal Aspects 41-42 where twelve decisive factors are outlined 
55
 Chul P K A Macroprudential Approach to Financial Supervision and Regulation: Conceptual and Operational 
Issues (October 2006) accessed 7 December 2014 at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2006/macropr/pdf/yungchul.pdf . 
56
 Read generally the International Monetary Fund Country Report No. 06/196 on the Republic of Armenia 
(2006) accessed 8th December 2014 at www.imf.org.  
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of a SADC Monetary Union taking into account the prospects of a harmonised, uniform or 
standardised system of financial services regulation and/or supervision.  
 
2.3.2 The Necessary Political Will among Stakeholders 
The formation and implementation of regulation and supervision rests on the political will of 
the relevant stakeholders. This proposition is valid in the case of both country specific pre-
requisites and for purposes of this research, SADC’s specific criteria. Therefore, the political 
will of the SADC Member States (through its various organs) would be a necessary step to 
ensuring the success of the Unification Model, and in fact any model if so recommended.  
Unfortunately, the lack of political will has remained a challenge for SADC from 
conception.57The reality however is that in every regional integration drive, financial 
regulation and supervision being no exception, political will coupled with the surrender of 
sovereignty to a certain degree is vital. This lack of political will in the SADC region 
continues to impede the growth of regional integration.58  
An indication of political will would, for example, entail SADC adopting rule-based 
mechanisms as opposed to cooperative endeavours because these are a fundamental necessity 
in the fulfilment of any regional integration pursuit. To date; SADC’s secretariat, which is 
responsible for the co-ordination of trade and regional integration initiatives, lacks the legal 
basis to ensure accountability, compliance and enforcement of decisions. Further, ‘SADC 
lacks a supranational authority to enforce decisions’.59 
                                                            
57
 SADC Major Achievements and Challenges: 25 years of Regional Cooperation and Integration October 2005 
accessed 14 March 2015 at http://www.sadc.int/documents-
publications/show/SADC%20Major%20Achievements%20and%20Challenges%20Handbook; Fisher L M & 
Ngoma N ‘The SADC Organ: Challenges in the New Millenium’ (2005) (114) Institute For Security Studies 5. 
58
 Ganetsang G ‘Whither SADC?’ Sunday Standard 22 August 2014 accessed 14 March 2015 at 
http://www.sundaystandard.info/article.php?NewsID=20842&GroupID=4 where it is reported that when the 
SADC Heads of State convened in Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe it was opined that ‘regional integration remains a 
mirage because of the lack of political will by SADC leaders.’; see also 
http://www.sadcpppnetwork.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=373:lack-of-political-will-
is-slowing-public-private-projects&catid=25&Itemid=257 on how SADC’s lack of political will is slowing down 
its Private-Pubic-Partnership Projects.   
59
 Saurombe A ‘Regional Integration Agenda for SADC “Caught in the winds of change” Problems and 
Prospects’ 100 104. 
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The proposal to have rule-based mechanisms must not be seen or understood as allowing 
political interference in the running of the said regulator. 60 The independence aspect of a 
regulator and supervisor and the underlying requirement of non-interference must never be 
misunderstood as non-accountability on the part of the regulator or supervisor.61 
2.3.3 Co-operation and Sharing of Information 
The Unification Model by its very nature denotes unity or co-operation within the financial 
services being regulated or supervised. The need for cooperation and information sharing is 
even more critical for a regional regulatory and supervisory agency or body, such as one 
considered in this research. The Unification Model, if adopted, would require that the 
financial sectors of the SADC Member States have an intricate communication and 
information sharing network to enable effective regulation, and not lead to the ‘Christmas 
tree’ effect.62 The current SADC set-up, based mainly on memorandums of understanding, 
lacks the legal requirement to set in motion a concrete information sharing network and thus 
does not meet this precondition.63 
2.3.4 Skilled Human Capital 
The skilled human capital precondition is two-dimensional. On the one hand, there is a need 
for skilled labour to effectively establish, develop and run the operations of a unified 
financial services regulator or supervisor. This would be especially vital in instances where 
there is a shift from the Silos Model to the Unification Model. The second dimension relates 
to the scarcity of skilled human capital. It has been submitted that the Unification Model best 
utilises this limited resource.64  
                                                            
60
 International Monetary Fund Working Paper, Issues in the Unification of Financial Sector Supervision 
(December 2000); International Monetary Fund Working Paper, Regulatory and Supervisory Independence and 
Financial Stability (March 2002). 
61
 International Monetary Fund Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies: 
Declaration of Principles accessed 10 December 2014 at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/mft/code/index.htm.  
62
 Mwenda in his Legal Aspects 43 describes this as a situation where economies of scale are watered down by 
regulators being overwhelmed with too much work rendering them inefficient and creating possible avenues 
for corruption. 
63
 Cabello M, Hands R, Grossman J, & Hayes J ‘Cross Border Banking Supervision in SADC Region’ (2013) 4(2) 
Applied Capital Markets-Insight 36 37. 
64
 Mwenda K & Flemming A ‘International Development in the Organisational Structure of Financial Services 
Supervision ’ (April 2001) accessed  10 December 2014 at  
http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/eca/eca.nsf/abdf2b83e74f58ef852567d10011a8ba/29e7611f0e618a52852568
9e006b1e1b/$FILE/International%20developments%20in%20the%20organizational%20structure%20of%20fin
ancial%20services%20supervision.pdf . 
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For SADC, if the Unification Model is recommended, the available skilled human capital will 
be tasked with merging the divergent systems to create this new regional Unification Model. 
Secondly, the skilled staff would have to implement this on a much larger regional scale. If 
hypothetically the only feasible implementation is by means of a supranational entity 
adopting the Unification Model, then the limited human resources not only has to merge the 
regulatory regimes, but must also be able to coordinate their implementation and supervision 
from one central place.    
2.3.5 Sufficient Financial Resources 
Regulatory and supervisory agencies within the Unification Model require adequate financial 
resources to carry out their activities, such as, on-site and off-site visits or even staff 
remuneration.  Resources are also tied to the issues of independence and accountability. As 
the saying goes, ‘talk is cheap but money buys the whiskey’: whoever provides the funding 
will inevitably have a say in the manner in which the regulation and supervision is 
undertaken. This reality is the reason why regulatory and supervisory authorities are often 
funded by an industry levy giving the regulator the flexibility to adequately address its 
needs.65  
2.3.6 Conglomerates and Cross-ownership 
This prerequisite sprouts from the reality that the Unification Model thrives in circumstances 
where there is an influx or growth of financial conglomerates.66 In the traditional Silos 
Model, the introduction of conglomeration or cross-ownership opened up the risk of 
regulatory arbitrage.67 This regulatory or supervisory arbitrage can be seen in firms 
channelling or redirecting risky activities to areas where there are softer rules of regulation 
and supervision.68  
On the SADC front the existence of such cross-ownership or conglomeration is without 
doubt. Several commercial banks, such as, First National Bank and Barclays Bank/ABSA are 
                                                            
65
 International Monetary Fund Working Paper, Issues in the Unification of Financial Sector Supervision 
(December 2000); International Monetary Fund Working Paper, Regulatory and Supervisory Independence and 
Financial Stability (March 2002) 7. 
66
 Mwenda K ‘Legal Aspects of Unified Financial sector Supervision in Germany’ (2003) 4 (10) German Law 
Journal 1009 1016. 
67
 Martínez J &Rose T ‘International Survey of Integrated Financial Sector Supervision’ World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper: Financial Sector Operations and Policy Department. (July 2003) accessed 10 
December 2014 at http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-3096.  
68
 International Monetary Fund Background Paper, Financial Sector Regulation: Issues and Gaps (17 August 
2004) 6 accessed 10 December 2014 at http://www.imf.org/external/np/mfd/2004/eng/081704.pdf . 
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based in one SADC state and carry out financial services in other SADC states. A grand 
example of a financial conglomerate in the SADC region is the Old Mutual Group which 
carries out insurance, banking and asset management activities in the SADC region.69 As a 
result, difficulty often arises with adhering to the varied regulatory and supervisory demands 
in place in the SADC states.  
2.3.7 Universal Banking Practice 
Closely linked to financial conglomerates and cross-ownership is the practice of universal 
banking.70 Therefore a similar argument is made that this precondition is sufficiently met 
within the SADC context. The SADC Banking Association provides an example of a regional 
attempt at taking strides in embracing the practice of universal banking.71 
2.3.8 Interconnected Segments of the Financial Sector 
The Unification Model cannot work if the financial sector or financial services that it aims to 
regulate and supervise lack interconnectedness.72 As already highlighted, the ‘unified’ 
element of this model was often embraced as addressing the misconception created by the 
Silos Model that the financial industries are separate, independent constituents of the 
financial sector. This precondition also allows the regulation or supervision under the 
Unification Model to be comprehensive as no ‘intermediate’ form of financial activity can go 
unnoticed and escape regulation. 
Although it is conceded that financial conglomerates exist within the SADC region and that 
the practice of universal banking forms part of the fabric of the SADC financial sector to 
allege interconnectedness of the segments therein would not be a true account. However, 
credit must be given to the SADC committees in place such as the CCGB, the Committee of 
SADC Stock Exchanges and the Committee on Insurance, Securities and Non-Banking 
                                                            
69
 Southern African Development Community, ‘Creating a Foundation for the Future’ Part III of Series accessed 
10 December 2014 at http://www.forbescustom.com/SectionPDFs/121012SADCSection.pdf . 
70
 Defined at http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=universal-bank  as a financial service conglomerate combining 
retail, wholesale and investment banking services under one roof and reaping synergies between them. 
71
 SADC Banking Association website accessed 1 February 2015  at http://www.sadcbanking.org/about.aspx   
72
 Mvula J & Mwenda K ‘Unified Financial Services Supervision in Latvia, the United Kingdom and the 
Scandinavian Countries’ 2003 10 (1) Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law paragraph 8 accessed 9 
December 2014 at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MurUEJL/2003/8.html . 
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Financial Authorities (CISNA), which have made strides in trying to create this link within 
the financial segments of the SADC Member States.73 
2.3.9 A Well Developed Public Infrastructure 
This includes buildings to house the regulatory agencies, good communication networks to 
create a solid link amongst the regulators and financial institutions. A good transport system 
is also an added advantage as this enables effective on-site supervision at a pace enabling the 
regulator to cover a large base in a limited amount of time. 
The disparity within the SADC Member States need not be emphasised. The regional 
community has financial service giants with intricate systems, such as, Mauritius and South 
Africa, in the same pot as those still developing such as Malawi and Botswana stewing in the 
direction of regional integration. It is important therefore that a good infrastructure is 
established in the SADC region. 
Once the preconditions have been discussed and possibly met, the next sensible step is to 
examine the advantages and disadvantages of the Unification Model. This is a natural step 
especially when one seeks to weigh up various models with regard to their effectiveness and 
efficiencies with the aim of either suggesting a viable one or a combination of various 
components of existing models. This is the object of this research. 
2.4 Advantages of the Unification Model 
2.4.1 Supervision of Financial Conglomerates 
This advantage is a direct consequence of the precondition requiring the existence of 
financial conglomerates and to a certain extent the practice of universal banking. Fragmented 
regulation and supervision, unlike the Unification Model, has given rise to the concern that 
such entities can’t be seamlessly regulated and supervised because of their presence in 
different jurisdictions.74  
If SADC is to adopt the Unification Model, this advantage will accrue because of the 
fragmentation concern expressed under the precondition of interconnectedness. This will not 
only benefit the regulatory and supervisory agency but will extend to the financial 
                                                            
73
 See SADC Website accessed 10 December 2014 at http://www.sadc.int/themes/economic-
development/finance/capital-markets/ .   
74
 International Monetary Fund Working Paper, Issues in the Unification of Financial Sector Supervision 
(December 2000); International Monetary Fund Working Paper, Regulatory and Supervisory Independence and 
Financial Stability (March 2002) 10.  
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conglomerates themselves as once one system is in place they will spend less time and 
resources adhering to different regulatory laws in different SADC countries.    
2.4.2 Competitive Neutrality 
It is trite that as financial services evolve and mature the demarcations between products and 
financial institutions have blurred. The Unification Model ensures that financial institutions 
that may be categorised differently but offering similar products are not regulated or 
supervised differently.75 This curbs instances where one institution offering similar services 
as another would have a competitive advantage because its regulation may be less stringent or 
cost less. 
The competition in non-Unification Models is not only among the service providers but may 
extend to the regulatory and supervisory agencies where one agency weakens its mechanisms 
in order to attract more financial institutions.  Certain financial services may subsequently be 
re-designed or modified to fit the criteria of the regulator offering more favourable terms. 
This advantage can be beneficial to SADC in its pursuit to make the whole region the 
ultimate investor destination. Instead of SADC states lowering or weakening their regulatory 
and supervisory standards in a competition to have financial institutions set up in their 
jurisdictions, one uniform system curbs this regulatory arbitrage. 
2.4.3Regulatory Flexibility 
This advantage caters for the emergence of financial products, institutions or services that 
may not have been originally catered for in the initial framework of a particular financial 
sector. The Unification Model therefore captures all other by-products that are not easily 
classifiable.76  
The flexibility is beneficial in both developed and developing or transition economies. With 
the former, financial innovation is rapid and changes in financial services being provided are 
often too fast for the law and regulations in place. The latter is often made up of ‘infant or 
test’ institutions where the likelihood of success in that particular financial sector is unknown. 
Regulatory flexibility therefore provides the emerging and transition economies with a 
                                                            
75
 Jadhav N ‘Single Regulator vs. Multiple Regulator’ accessed 10 December 2014 at 
http://www.drnarendrajadhav.info/newversion/drjadhav-
data_files/Published%20papers/Single%20versus%20Multiple%20Regulator.pdf.  
76
 Supervision of financial services in the OECD area accessed 11 December 2014 at 
http://www.oecd.org/finance/financial-markets/1939320.pdf 
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platform to refine, restructure and polish the financial services to suit their economy without 
rendering laws obsolete.77  
As previously highlighted the SADC package is a peculiar one with developed, developing 
and least developed economies. This Unification Model advantage of flexibility is one that 
falls smoothly into the SADC dynamic. Whereas South Africa will be battling rapidly-
changing financial services, Lesotho, Democratic Republic of Congo and Swaziland may still 
be trying to determine whether certain financial services should be woven into the fabrics of 
their economies. 
2.4.4 Regulatory Efficiency 
The rational has always been that a larger organisation permits finer specialisation of labour 
and more intensive utilisation of input. This may be extended to a regulatory framework that 
will enable sharing of infrastructure, administration and support systems and will avoid the 
duplication that is seen in the Silos Model.78 A central data collection point is also beneficial 
to effective and timely reporting. Once the reports are submitted on time the agencies are then 
able to make good comparisons and address concerns appropriately. 
2.4.5 Developing a Professional Body of Staff 
Tied to the prerequisite of skilled human capital is the advantage that a professional body of 
staff will be developed where there is no competition for the limited skills available. It has 
been submitted, correctly so, that a larger employer of financial regulators is better placed to 
create a coherent human resource policy and take into account career planning and maximum 
utilisation of the resource.79  
Secondly, in the era where the demarcations in the financial sectors are admittedly blurred, 
the Unification Model allows regulators and supervisors with specialised knowledge in a 
particular industry that encroaches on another to extend their expertise to the sector in need. 
An example would be where insurance-based financial services sprout in the banking sector: 
the insurance experts of the Unification Model can advise the assigned banking regulators 
and supervisors accordingly.  
                                                            
77
 Ganapoulou VAN ‘The FSA as an institutional Model for the Emergence of (Single) Unified European Financial 
Service Regulator’ (2003) 14 (3) European Business Law Review 277. 
78
 International Monetary Fund Working Paper, Issues in the Unification of Financial Sector Supervision 
(December 2000) 13. 
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 International Monetary Fund Working Paper, Issues in the Unification of Financial Sector Supervision 
(December 2000) 14. 
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2.5 Disadvantages of the Unification Model80 
2.5.1 Unclear Objectives 
Large direction lacking entities by their very nature can create some confusion. Under the 
Unification Model the regulators and supervisors are tasked with a range of activities from 
avoiding systemic risk to protecting consumer fraud. This may create a scenario where the 
entity appears to have no determined sense of direction.81 The problem with unclear 
objectives is that it can create a lacuna as to who bears responsibility for certain actions or a 
finger-pointing blame game within the agency. 
By the same token, unwanted political influence in an entity with unclear objectives can 
cause strife.82 If the regulators and supervisors do not explicitly know what they aim to do, 
then political leaders can issue directives to the detriment of the overall mandate of the 
regulatory authority. 
If such concerns are raised in countries, it goes without question that the complexity of 
unclear convoluted objectives in a regional Unification Model agency would cause chaos. If 
one entity is tasked with regulating and supervising the entire SADC financial sector one can 
be sure that the reality of unclear objectives will be first to surface. This is so because the 
different states forming the regional economic community are at different levels of financial 
development and have different aims. An attempt to unify all their objectives under one 
umbrella entity might simply be impractical. 
2.5.2 Diseconomies of Scale 
Diseconomies of scale are also incidental to the existence of a large unified ‘monopoly’ 
regulator. One of the highlighted challenges is the bureaucratic nature of unified regulators 
and supervisors.83 A small change to a rigid bureaucratic agency may be difficult to 
implement. Large unified regulators or supervisors may also create an opportunity to be 
turned into some kind of ‘dumping site’. This occurs when even sectors not directly within 
their purview are squeezed in to try and make use of the available resources. This 
                                                            
80
 The framework of these disadvantages is provided by the International Monetary Fund Working Paper, 
Issues in the Unification of Financial Sector Supervision (December 2000) 17-19. 
81
 Hussain B Integrated Financial Supervision and its Implications for Banking Sector Stability (unpublished 
honours thesis, New York University, 2009) 11. 
82
 International Monetary Fund Working Paper, Is One Watchdog Better than Three? International Experience 
with Integrated Financial Sector Supervision (March 2006) 11. 
83
 Schüler M Integrated Financial Supervision in Germany, ZEW Discussion Paper No.04-35 3 
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disadvantage, like the unclear objectives concern needs solid structures and focused 
management teams.84 
 
 
 
2.5.3 Limited Synergies 
Although one would like to think that the operations of all regulators and supervisors are 
materially similar, this is not often the case.85 One of the biggest tasks the management of a 
Unification Model has is to try and align the tasks of these agencies. It has been said that 
whereas banking supervisors operate like doctors examining the health and wellbeing of their 
patients, securities supervisors are like policemen trying to catch unruly dealers.86 The reality 
may therefore be that whereas the aim and hope of unification is that it should be a joint and 
collective effort of financial sector regulation and supervision, the disparities may hinder this. 
2.5.4 Moral Hazard 
Moral hazard relates to a situation where the public may be misguided into believing that the 
Unification Model necessarily means that all financial institutions are regulated the same 
manner and therefore confidence in one sector means confidence in all.87 
In the SADC context this may be risky for investors who may strongly believe for example 
that having set up in Tanzania or Namibia which is being regulated under the Unification 
Model, the same results should be anticipated or will yield when setting up in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo or in Zimbabwe. Ideal as this might be, the unfortunate reality is that such 
may not be a true reflection of the real situation. Harmonised regulation does not mean that 
the services provided will be received equally in all states. 
                                                            
84
 International Monetary Fund Working Paper, Issues in the Unification of Financial Sector Supervision 
(December 2000) 17 
85
 Working Paper in Responsible Banking and Finance, The Impact of the Organisation of Bank Supervision on 
Bank’s Risk Taking Behaviour (4
th
 Quarter 2013) 7. 
86
 International Monetary Fund Working Paper, Issues in the Unification of Financial Sector Supervision 
(December 2000).  
87
 Financial Services Authority Occasional Paper 2 The Rationale for Single National Financial Services Regulator 
(May 1999) 26; Mwenda K ‘Are African Countries Ready for Unified Financial services Regulator?’ African 
Growth Agenda June-August 2006. 
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2.6 Types of Unification 
As noted above, a key distinction is made between full and partial unification. Botswana is a 
country embracing partial unification with the Bank of Botswana overseeing the banking 
NBFIRA regulating and supervising the remaining portion of the financial sector.  On the 
other hand, a Malawi is an example of full unification where the entire financial sector is 
regulated under the auspices of the Reserve Bank of Malawi.  
2.7 CASE STUDIES 
2.7.1 BOTSWANA 
2.7.1.1 Introduction 
Historically Botswana’s financial sector has been very small and its development very slow. 
The Bank of Botswana (BoB) was first established in 1975 and soon thereafter the Pula, 
Botswana’s national currency, was introduced in 1976.88 At the material time only two 
commercial banks (Barclays Bank and Standard Chartered Bank) operated in the jurisdiction 
and the conditions for granting the banking licences were very strict and to some extent 
unattainable as the existing banks could object to the grant of a banking licence.89  The 
dominant duopoly was finally broken in 1982 when the Bank of Credit and Commerce 
Botswana was established in Botswana, but it remained relatively small and did nothing to 
actively challenge the two major banks.90 
Other existing financial institutions at the time were the Botswana Savings Bank (originally 
established in Botswana in 1911 as the Post Office Savings Bank, a subsidiary of the South 
African Post Office Savings Bank), the National Development Bank established in 1964, the 
Botswana Development Corporation of 1970 and the Botswana Building Society which was 
locally incorporated in 1977.91 
                                                            
88
 Chapter 6 of Botswana’s National Development Plan 9 (NDP 9) accessed 11 December 2014 at 
http://www.sarpn.org/documents/d0001172/ ; Currently NDP 10 is in place and will be completed in 2016 
marking 50years of independence for Botswana. NDP 10 is available at 
http://www.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/country_docs/Botswana/ndp_botswana.pdf . 
89
 Botswana Financial Sector Overview 2009/2010 accessed 11 December 2014 at 
http://www.econsult.co.bw/tempex/BOTSWANA%20FINANCIAL%20SECTOR%20OVERVIEW.pdf (hereinafter 
Botswana FSO 2009/2010).  
90
 See Bank of Botswana website accessed 19 April 2015 at 
http://www.bankofbotswana.bw/content/2009112321034-major-developments-since-the-establishment-of-
bank-botswana  
91
 Botswana FSO 2009/2010 4. 
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The current complexion of the financial sector can be separated into two broad categories, 
viz. the banking sector and the non-bank financial institutions sector.92  The banking sector 
comprises nine commercial banks, one merchant bank, one off-shore bank, and one statutory 
deposit taking institution. The non-bank financial institutions are the Botswana Stock 
Exchange, insurers (short-term and long-term), pension funds, asset managers, credit 
institutions, micro-finance institutions, collective investments undertakings, statutory 
development financial institutions, statutory funds, and the Public Debt Service Fund.93 
2.7.1.2 Regulation of Botswana’s Financial Sector 
Botswana’s financial sector has embraced the partial Unification Model (outside the central 
bank) with the banking sector and the bureaux de change regulated and supervised by the 
Bank of Botswana (BoB) in terms of the Banking Act (CAP 46:04 of the Laws of the 
Republic of Botswana)94 and the non-bank financial institutions regulated and supervised by 
the Non-Bank Financial Institutions Regulatory Authority (NBFIRA) in terms of the Non-
Bank financial Institutions Regulatory Authority Act (CAP 46:08 of the Laws of the Republic 
of Botswana).95 
The central aim of the regulation of Botswana’s financial sector is to ensure that its 
operations and performances are sound and limit systemic risk.96 Ultimately, once this is 
ensured, depositors and the integrity of the financial system as a whole are protected.  
According to the Bank of Botswana Annual Report 201397 the banking system was healthy 
during 2013, with such assessment being made with the aid of bilateral and trilateral meetings 
together with on-site and off-site supervision. Banks are reported as prudently managed, 
profitable, liquid, safe, and sound.98 
Fifteen enquiries were received in 2013with regard to establishing a banking business in 
Botswana but no subsequent applications were made. Four applications were made in 2012, 
                                                            
92
 Botswana NDP 10 . 
93
 Botswana FSO 2009/2010 8. 
94
 Accessed 11 December 2014 at http://www.bankofbotswana.bw/assets/uploaded/Banking%20Act.pdf . 
95
 Accessed 11 December 2014 at http://www.nbfira.org.bw/sites/default/files/CHAPTER%204608%20NON-
BANK%20FINANCIAL%20INSTITUTIONS%20REGULATORY%20AUTHORITY.pdf.  
96
 Botswana NDP 10 Finance and Banking 134. 
97
 The 2013 BoB annual report was themed around the topic Household Participation in the Financial Sector, 
Debt Sustainability and Impact on Financial Stability was accessed 11 December 2014 at 
http://www.bankofbotswana.bw/assets/uploaded/BoB%20AR%202012%20Main%20only_1.pdf. (hereinafter 
BoB annual report 2013)   
98
 BoB annual report 2013 22. 
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two were approved with the banks commencing business in 2013; and two were 
unsuccessful.99 
In practice, the Banking Act as the primary legislation provides the basis for some of the 
requirements in the banking sector. For example, Section 6(1) (a) of the Banking Act 
provides: 
‘Every application for a licence to transact banking business in Botswana shall- 
(a) be made in writing to the Central Bank in such form as shall be determined by the 
Bank, and accompanied by such processing fee as may be prescribed; and the Central 
bank shall cause such application to be published in the Gazette;…' 
 
The governing statute provides for the regulatory agency (herein the Central Bank) to set 
such further requirement as it may deem fit to effectively carry out its mandate. 100 Further 
specific and detailed requirements, where the BoB exercises discretion include a minimum 
capital requirement which has been set at P5million, technical knowledge, experience of the 
applicant, character of the business and the needs of the community or market to be served.101 
 
The Non-Bank Financial Institutions (NBFIs) can be classified into six categories. These are 
the capital markets comprising of the Botswana Stock Exchange, Pensions and Provident 
Funds, Insurance, Collective Investment Undertakings, Non-bank lenders (for example Micro 
finance Institutions), and,  lastly, Asset Managers.102 The bulk of the aforementioned 
categories remained unregulated and unsupervised before the establishment of NBFIRA in 
2006. The few that were regulated such as the Botswana Stock Exchange and the Pensions 
and Provident Funds were under the purview of the Minister of Finance and Development 
Planning. 
NBFIRA, like BoB aims to ensure ultimate stability, safety, soundness, and high standards 
within the NBFIs. It performs its objectives in terms of the various rights and regulatory 
functions conferred by the Acts.103 Similarly, these principal Acts merely set the base for 
                                                            
99
 BoB annual report 2013 23. 
100
 This is also noted in Section 8 (3) of the Banking Act. 
101
 Botswana FSO 2009/2010 9. 
102
 Bojosi K ‘An appraisal of the new legal framework for the regulation of non-bank financial institutions in 
Botswana.’(2012) 15 University of Botswana Law Journal 29 31. 
103
 Sections 7 and 8 of the NBFIRA Act. 
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NBFIRA’s work and it continues to be tasked with creating prudential rules and regulations 
to supplement and complement the rules under the main statutes.104 
The relationship between NBFIRA, the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning and 
the BoB is also observed in the composition of the NBFIRA Board of Directors.105Both the 
Central Bank Governor and the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry sit on the Board ex 
officio. Moreover, NBFIRA shall consult and/or enter into agreements with the BoB and 
other government departments as regards its regulation and supervision activities, taxation, 
social security or the general financial system.106 
In light of the above relationship, questions have been raised about the independence of 
NBFIRA which is a crucial factor for any regulatory authority. A discussion of the 
independence and accountability of the Unification Model follows below. 
2.7.2 MALAWI 
2.7.2.1 Introduction 
The Reserve Bank of Malawi (RBM) was established in July 1964 under an Act of 
Parliament (Reserve Bank of Malawi Act Chapter 44:02 of the Laws of Malawi) and started 
its operations in June 1965 replacing the Federal Bank of Rhodesia and Nyasaland which was 
serving as the central bank of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.107  
The evolution of today’s Malawian financial sector can be traced to the late 1980’s when the 
RBM and the Banking Acts were put under review.108 This review led to the establishment of 
the presently operational Banking Act of 1989. Other Acts such as the Capital Market 
Development Act were also introduced to enhance the Malawian financial sector. 
As at 31 December 2012, the Malawian banking sector comprised twelve commercial banks 
with over seventy branches across the country. These are the National Bank of Malawi, 
Standard Bank, First Merchant Bank, NBS Bank, Malawi Savings Bank, Indebank Limited, 
                                                            
104
 Mosinyi W ‘Bank CEO quits to play ‘second fiddle’ at NBFIRA’ Mmegionline accessed 12 December 2014 at 
http://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?sid=4&aid=40&dir=2009/October/Friday2.  
105
 Section 11 of the NBFIRA Act. 
106
 Section 40(1) and (2) of the NBFIRA act. 
107
 Reserve Bank of Malawi accessed 14 December 2014 at https://www.rbm.mw/.    
108
 Kalanda A, ‘Development of Malawi’s Microfinance Regulation and Supervision’ (2006)  Essays on 
Regulation and Supervision 4. 
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NEDBANK Malawi Limited, Opportunity Bank of Malawi, ECOBANK Malawi Limited, 
FDH Bank, International Commercial Bank, and CDH Investment Bank.109  
Other members of the finance sector include two leasing companies, one discount house, a 
building society, a finance company, four development institutions, and several insurance 
companies and pension funds.110 As can be observed, banks, dominate the financial sector 
accounting for 80% of total financial sector assets. Further, two main banks hold more than 
50 per cent of the banking industry’s total assets and deposits.111 Meanwhile, less than 20 per 
cent of the Malawian population have access to banking services while only 3 per cent utilise 
insurance products.112 
Despite these apparent challenges Malawi’s financial sector has remained broadly sound as it 
strives to comply with Basel II requirements.113 
2.7.2.2 Regulation of Malawi’s Financial Sector 
The RBM is the central player in the Malawian financial system. It is committed to 
safeguarding financial stability and tightening financial sector surveillance and monitoring.114 
Formal regulatory reforms in Malawi commenced in 2002 under the auspices of the World 
Bank and the Malawian Government. The Malawian Financial Sector Regulatory Reform 
Program revealed inter alia the underdeveloped and bank-centric nature of the Malawian 
financial sector.115  
It is upon such realisation that Malawi has adopted the full Unification Model where the 
Registrar of Financial Institutions who is the Governor is the Reserve Bank of Malawi is the 
regulator and supervisor of the entire financial sector.116 The Malawian Financial Services 
                                                            
109
 Reserve Bank of Malawi Bank Supervision Annual Report 2012 accessed 14 December 2014 at 
http://www.rbm.mw/documents/basu/RBM%20BASU%20ANNUAL%20REPORT%202012.pdf.  
110
 Burritt K, ‘Expanding Access to Financial Services in Malawi’ UNCDF 
111
 Mwanakatwe P ‘Malawi 2014’ AIDB, OECD, UNDP 2014 accessed 14 December 2014 at 
www.africaneconomicoutlook.org (hereinafter Mwanakatwe P ‘Malawi 2014’.  
112
 Mwanakatwe P ‘Malawi 2014’ 9. 
113
 Davies H &Green D Global Financial Regulation: The Essential Guide (2008) 32-42 which candidly explains 
the history of the Basel requirements form Basel I of 1997 and ultimately that Basel I was agreed on in 2004  
based on the three pillars of minimum capital requirements, supervisory review and market discipline.  
114
 Mwanakatwe P ‘Malawi 2014’ 10. 
115
 Speech by the Deputy Bank Governor  of the Reserve Bank of Malawi(Supervision of Financial Institutions) 
one Grant Kabango at a seminar on Financial Service Laws for Lawyers on the 22
nd
 June 2012 in Zomba, Malawi 
accessed 14 December 2014 at http://www.bis.org/review/r120904c.pdf  
116
 Presentation on Regulation of Financial Cooperatives: The Case of Malawi by Mtchaisi Chintengo being the 
Chief Examiner (Microfinance Institutions and SACCOS) at the Reserve Bank of Malawi accessed 12 December 
2014 at 
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Act of 2010117provides in its preamble that it is ‘An Act to make provision for the 
supervision and regulation of financial institutions and for matters connected therewith and 
incidental thereto’. 
It therefore provides the foundation for the regulation and supervision of financial institutions 
in Malawi which aims to fulfil the main object of fostering safe and sound financial 
institutions with high standards and general stability of the financial system.118 
Additionally, the Government of Malawi together with the RBM adopted a policy drive to 
address the deficit in the non-bank financial sector in order for it to add a degree of resilience 
to the existing financial system. One of its biggest achievements is the Pensions Act of 2011 
which cured Malawi’s awkward, fragmented and non-comprehensive original social security 
system to create a solid framework for the operation and regulation of the system.119  
Although all being housed in the Central Bank, the RBM like Botswana’s NBFIRA has 
several ‘subsets’ within the single regulator aimed at the regulation of different aspects of the 
financial sector. The three main ones are: the bank supervision department, the pensions and 
insurance department, and the microfinance and capital markets department. 
Under the 1989 Banking Act and the Reserve Bank of Malawi Act, the RBM is tasked with 
supplementing the provisions of the Acts by issuing prudential directives that will assist 
Malawi in complying with international standards. An example of this is Directive NO. 
LRR1-07 FMO being the Liquidity Reserve Requirement authorised by Section 38 of the 
Banking Act of 1989, (CAP 44:01 Laws of Malawi), and Section 30, 36 and 48 of the 
Reserve Bank of Malawi Act, 1989, (CAP 44:02 Laws of Malawi).120 
The existence of one regulator in Malawi for the entire financial sector has been seen as 
advantageous to the extent that it creates leverage on financial resources, utilises fully the 
available knowledge and skills and creates a solid information network for the regulation and 
supervision of financial institutions. 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.treasury.gov.za/coopbank/Conferences/CFI%20Indaba%20and%2014th%20SACCA%20Congress%
2028%20Oct%20-%201%20Nov%202013/Regulation%20of%20financial%20cooperatives.pdf . 
117
 Accessed 12 December 2014 at 
https://www.rbm.mw/documents/basu/FINANCIAL%20SERVICES%202010.pdf  
118
 Section 3 Malawian Financial Services Act paraphrased. 
119
 Mhango M & Thejane P ‘The Malawi Pensions Act: A General Commentary on some of the core mandatory 
provisions with specific reference to sections 9, 10, and 15’ (2012) 129 The South African Law Journal 758 
120
 Directive on the Liquidity Reserve Requirement accessed 14 December 2014 at 
https://www.rbm.mw/documents/basu/Liquidity%20Reserve%20Requirement%20No%20LRR1-07-FMO.pdf.  
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2.8 Conclusion 
Finally, there is need for one to look at whether this Unification Model is both independent 
and accountable and viable for the SADC region. From the above analysis, it can be 
submitted that accountability of the model would not create the biggest concern as only one 
or two entities (depending on the type of unification) will be held accountable. The one-stop 
shop approach to data collection may also be beneficial for the model‘s accountability. 
The greatest concern is the independence of this model. Independence is needed in various 
forms, such as, regulatory, supervisory and budgetary independence.121 The Malawian 
example is a clear depiction of how independence of the agency in all the above respects may 
be compromised. For example with the funding mostly coming from the government, there is 
no doubt that this is an indication that there is a deficit in the budgetary independence of the 
regulator.  The regulatory and supervisory functions of the entire state are housed in the 
Central Bank, a precarious place which might be subject to indirect political influence. A 
more significant and direct influence is seen with the Governor of the RBM which is a 
political office.122 
Botswana is no exception. NBFIRA has a legislative obligation to report and consult the 
Minister of Finance and Development Planning who also sits on the authority’s Board. The 
Minister is a political figure with natural political endeavours, ties and ideas that may not 
positively benefit the regulatory authority. Political pressures are very detrimental to financial 
services regulators and supervisors and often render them incapacitated and unable to 
perform their duties turning them into ‘toothless bulldogs’.123 
One very noteworthy argument is made in the case of Malawi. Nkowani124 insightfully 
submits that Malawi’s recent financial sector reform did not use the SADC’s FIP as a 
guideline and therefore its tenets are in some respects not in tune with SADC’s ultimate 
mission of regional integration. Some of the reasons he advances are that Malawi’s 
transformation began long before the adoption of the 2006 SADC FIP and that even after its 
                                                            
121
 Madise S Developing an Independent Regulatory Framework for the Financial Sector in Malawi (unpublished 
LLM thesis, University of the Western Cape 2010-2011) 19. 
122
 Nkowani Z ‘The SADC Finance and Investment Protocol and the Reform of the Malawian Financial Services 
Regulatory Framework: Reflections in Retrospect’ (2009) (3)(1) Malawian Law Journal 7 20. 
123
 International Monetary Fund Working paper, The Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors: Principles 
and Practice (March 2005). 
124
 Nkowani Z ‘The SADC Finance and Investment Protocol and the Reform of the Malawian Financial Services 
Regulatory Framework: Reflections in Retrospect’ (2009) (3)(1) Malawian Law Journal 7 17. 
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adoption it remained relatively unknown to some stakeholders involved in the Malawian 
reform process. 
The next chapter analyses the Twin Peaks Model with South Africa as the case in point for its 
adoption in SADC. Thereafter, the mini-thesis continues to discuss the other primary model 
being the Silos Model before attempting to make a noteworthy recommendation regarding 
SADC’s regional regulator.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE TWIN PEAKS MODEL 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter discussed the Unification Model which denotes, as the term suggests, a 
model that is united and falls under one umbrella regulator and supervisor. Although this is 
truly an oversimplification of the nature and character of the Unification Model, it is perhaps 
a good starting point when one introduces the Twin Peaks Model which, as the name also 
suggests has two ‘twin’ authorities regulating and supervising the financial sector. 
The Twin Peaks Model as it is understood today is the brain child of an officer of the Bank of 
England one Michael Taylor who first advocated for it in his famous 1995 compilation  ‘Twin 
Peaks’: A Regulatory Structure for the New Century.125 The gist of his proposal was to make 
a clear distinction between the prudential regulators which would focus on systemic 
protection vis-à-vis the conduct of business regulator having consumer protection 
objectives.126 Often an analogy is made of a ‘doctor’ role for the prudential arm and a ‘cop’ 
for the conduct of business arm. 127 Whereas the doctor will focus on curing the illness in the 
financial system, cop will police and address regulatory breach.  
 Thereafter, the next pivotal recollection in the evolution of the Twin Peaks Model is in 
Australia under the Financial Systems Inquiry of 1997(Wallis Inquiry 1997).128 Therein, a 
radical change to the financial services regulation and supervision in Australia was 
recommended and Australia became the first country to adopt the Twin Peaks Model in 
1998.129 The result was that Australia abandoned its Silos Model with ten regulators (the 
Silos Model is discussed further in chapter 4) and created two new regulators as envisioned 
by the Twin Peaks Model. These are the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) 
                                                            
125
 Bakir C ‘The Governance of Financial Regulatory Reform: The Australian Experience’ (2009) 87(4) Public 
Administration 910  917. 
126
 Taylor M ‘The Road from “Twin Peaks” and the Way Back’ (2009) 16(1) Connecticut Insurance Law Journal 
61.  
127
 Davies H &Green D Global Financial Regulation: The Essential Guide (2008) 191 
128
 Financial Systems Inquiry Final Report (18 March 1997) accessed 18 February 2015 at 
http://www.google.co.bw/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&uact=8&sqi=2&ved=0CCc
QFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Ffsi.treasury.gov.au%2Fcontent%2Fdownloads%2FFinalReport%2FPrelim.doc&ei=k
WrkVNLKCYaT7AaLlYGYBg&usg=AFQjCNFTRGwN3yf9mgPDRm9fo4ofKStRaQ&sig2=ws4gW3w4qLJx2Bi8RF4LFQ
&bvm=bv.85970519,d.ZWU . 
129
 Bakir C ‘The Governance of Financial Regulatory Reform: The Australian Experience’ (2009) 87(4) Public 
Administration 910  911. 
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which became fully operational 1 July 1998 and the Australian Securities and Investment 
(ASIC) with the former as the prudential regulator and the latter being for conduct of 
business.130 
3.2 What is the Twin Peaks Model? 
Like the Unification Model, the Twin Peaks Model is not set along institutional lines and is 
regulation and supervision by objectives. For its part it envisages the creation of two agencies 
responsible for prudential and conduct of business regulation and supervision.131 Simply, the 
former’s main objective is to ensure the safety and soundness of the institutions (protect 
customers’ assets) whereas the latter focuses on consumer protection (protect customers’ 
rights).132 Since these two pillars of prudential regulation and conduct of business form the 
bedrock of the Twin Peaks Model it is vital for one to have a deeper understanding of what 
these entail. 
3.2.1 Prudential Regulation 
Prudential regulation aims to ‘safeguard the stability of the financial system and to protect 
deposits’.133Therefore it examines the ‘deposit takers’ in the financial sector being both the 
banks and the non-bank financial institutions to ensure that they are being operated in a 
sensible way within the confines of the law. An interesting position is advanced by a 
professor of economics one Joshua Aizenman that for as long the economy is healthy the 
‘financial doctor’ being the prudential regulator is considered redundant.134 He calls this the 
paradox of prudential regulation in the capitalist economy. 
This paradox, he further submits, is what ultimately leads to a financial calamity because for 
as long as the prudential regulator is perceived as redundant and as an inhibiter of growth and 
development, the players in the financial market become complacent. In some instances the 
calamity isn’t created by the complacency of the financial service providers but by loopholes 
in the prudential regulations and weak enforcement of the same.135 Brownbridge cites Zambia 
                                                            
130
 Hussain B Integrated Financial Supervision and its Implications for Banking Sector Stability (unpublished 
honours thesis, New York University, 2009) 7. 
131
 Llewelyn 2006 27. 
132
 Strickett C ‘What do the changes in regulation mean for the SA insurance industry?’ CapeTimes Buiness 
Report 30 April 2015 
133
 Brownbridge M ‘Policy Lessons for Prudential Regulation in Developing Countries’ (2002) 20(3) 
Development Policy Review 305 306. 
134
 Aizenman J ‘On Prudential Regulation: To Regulate Foreign or Domestic Intermediation?’ Havard 
International Review (Winter 2009) 56. 
135
 Brownbridge M ‘Policy Lessons for Prudential Regulation in Developing Countries’ (2002) 20(3) 
Development Policy Review 305 307-308. 
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as a country where the bank licensing regulations were lax leading to banks with inadequate 
capital being licensed.136 If this led to calamity the issue then isn’t that the prudential 
regulator didn’t properly discharge its functions but that the regulations in themselves are 
insufficient. 
3.2.2 Conduct of Business 
Conduct of business regulations create an obligation on the financial companies or financial 
service providers to act fairly and impartially towards their consumers.137In its purest form it 
‘recognises that ordinary consumer protection laws do not go far enough when dealing with 
the financial sector, which needs much higher and tailored standards than generic 
legislation’138.Therefore, consumer protection issues are at the heart of conduct of business 
regulation.139 Simply, conduct of business regulation dictates how financial service providers 
should carry on their business with their customers.  
Some of the objectives embodied in conduct of business regulation are to protect consumers 
from incomplete information, bad practices and generally unfair rules that financial firms 
may impose on their consumers making their positions weak in the financial contracts.140  
One cannot speak of the Twin Peaks Model and not mention the opposing views advanced by 
many scholars on this notion that Taylor had conceived. The biggest criticism to the Twin 
Peaks Model was that Taylor’s distinction between the prudential regulator and the conduct 
of business regulator was not as clean and neat as he had outlined it. In fact the idea was seen 
as duplicitous in some regards and impractical and unrealistic in others.141 This is when the 
Unification Model (as discussed above in Chapter 2) was seen as a better alternative for the 
United Kingdom as opposed to the Twin Peaks Model since it had an all-encompassing 
approach that would ideally be more efficient.  
                                                            
136
 Brownbridge M ‘Policy Lessons for Prudential Regulation in Developing Countries’ (2002) 20(3) 
Development Policy Review 305 307-308. 
137
 Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority Consultation Paper on the Review of Conduct of Business Rules 
for Financial Service Providers (March 2004) 
138
 National Treasury of South Africa Discussion Document Treating Customers Fairly in the Financial Sector: A 
Draft Market Conduct Policy Framework for South Africa (December 2014) as subsequently amended accessed 
20 March 2015 at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/FSR2014/Treating%20Customers%20Fairly%20in%20the%2
0Financial%20Sector%20Draft%20MCP%20Framework%20Amended%20Jan2015%20WithAp6.pdf (hereinafter 
NT Treating Customers Fairly). 
139
 Financial Services Authority Occasional Paper 2 The Rationale for Single National Financial Services 
Regulator (May 1999) 24. 
140
 Llewellyn DT Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation and Supervision: The Basic Issues (2006) 15 
141
 Financial Services Authority Occasional Paper 2 The Rationale for Single National Financial Services 
Regulator (May 1999) 24. 
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Needless to say Taylor’s critics were disappointed when the global financial crisis revealed 
that the Unification Model had, at least in the UK scenario, compromised prudential 
regulation and focused mainly on conduct of business which meant that critical issues of 
systemic stability has simply slipped through the cracks.142 
3.2.3 The role of the Central Bank 
Salient to the discussion on the Twin Peaks Model is the role of the central bank. In some 
jurisdictions the prudential authority is housed in the Central Bank (South Africa and the 
Netherlands) whereas other jurisdictions an independent entity is formed (Australia).143 An 
informed submission has been made by Carmichael that in emerging markets (SADC being 
no exception) prudential regulation should be kept with system stability within the central 
bank.144 This in simple terms means that if SADC was to propose the Twin Peaks Model the 
prudential peak should ideally remain in the Central Bank. 
From conception the Twin Peaks Model aims not only to reap the benefits and efficacies of 
the Unification Model but to take a step further in addressing a common conflict that may 
arise within the unified context. This is in the case where prudential regulation is in conflict 
with conduct of business regulation and consumer protection issues, there is no bulldozing in 
the Twin Peaks Model therefore no regulation will be deemed ‘superior’.145 
3.3 Advantages of the Twin Peaks Model 
3.3.1 Clearly defined objectives 
Unlike with the Unification Model where objectives can be blurred, under the Twin Peaks 
Model the two agencies have clearly defined objectives enabling them to carry out their work 
expediently and creating an obligation of accountability on the part of each agency.146 The 
author’s understanding goes as far as suggesting that each of the ‘peaks’ keeps checks and 
balance on the other and ensures that each is performing their designated roles. 
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 Taylor M ‘The Road from “Twin Peaks” and the Way Back’ (2009) 16(1) Connecticut Insurance Law Journal 
61; Llewellyn DT Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation and Supervision: The Basic Issues (2006) 25. 
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 Carmichael J Regulatory Structure Presentation at Regional Seminar of NBFI’s in East Asia, Bangkok 
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lac/pdf/03carmichael2.pdf . 
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This advantage is undoubtedly vital to the development of a regional regulator for SADC 
since it will be operating and working in over ten jurisdictions. The problem of unclear 
objectives can lead to unwanted political influence and interference and therefore the idea 
that a regulator can have clearly set objectives is an attractive feature for the proposed SADC 
model. 
3.3.2 Balanced Regulation and Supervision 
When only one unified regulator is in place there is a danger that only one aspect of 
regulation will be ‘guarded’ often at the expense of the other. For instance, it has been alleged 
that with the Unification Model focus is on the prudential aspect and the conduct of business 
wing lags behind.147 In the UK scenario, the inverse was discovered where focus appeared to 
have been on the conduct of business at the expense of the prudential wing.148Since the Twin 
Peaks Model embodies two distinct agencies, no one should dominate over the other. 
Similarly, a model that strives to have a balanced approach to regulation and supervision will 
be ideal for the proposed SADC regional regulator because when a regulator covers a large 
spectrum, if one ‘arguably insignificant’ aspect is overlooked it could culminate into a 
problem in the regulatory process and make it susceptible to manipulation. Hypothetically if 
during times of financial tranquillity prudential regulation was overlooked by a regional 
regulator in the entire SADC region, it is truism that financial service providers would try and 
manipulate the situation (such as take bigger unwarranted risks) which could lead to financial 
calamity.  
3.3.3 Less concentration of power 
As compared to the Unification Model, the Twin Peaks has less concentration of power with 
one entity. This allows the Twin Peaks Model to accommodate changes taking place in the 
financial services market.149 The Australian proactive and anticipatory approach to the 
adoption of this model is the best example to cite when the twin peaks’ accommodative 
nature is discussed. Despite the fact that nothing was inherently wrong with the old 
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148
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Australian model, it was the astuteness of the Wallis Inquiry that put Australia in an 
‘accommodative’ position when the global financial crisis hit in 2008.150 
As already noted SADC is comprised of emerging economies and therefore changes in the 
financial services is an undeniable consequence of any developing economy. A regulatory 
framework that is accommodative in nature would be beneficial to any financial services 
sector going through changes. More significantly and has been highlighted throughout the 
entire research the SADC Member States are at different levels of economic advancement 
and therefore  a regulator that has the elasticity to accommodate all these diverging 
economies would be welcome. 
3.3.4 Better regulation of Financial Conglomerates 
The best way to elucidate this advantage is to draw from the lessons of the United Kingdom. 
After Taylor’s Twin Peaks proposal was rejected and the Unification Model adopted in the 
UK, the global financial crisis hit in 2007 leading to the failure of the Northern Rock 
mortgage bank in the UK which could be characterised as a financial conglomerate.151 
One of the realisations in the wake of the crisis was that the single regulator had focused 
mainly on conduct of business at the expense of the prudential wing of regulation.152 This is 
not a sentiment expressed by Taylor alone, the British Government’s White Paper on 
regulatory reform after the crisis also stated that ‘too much weight had been placed on 
conduct of business regulation of the banking sector rather than prudential regulation of 
banking institutions’153 
In the previous chapter mention is made of the growing number of financial conglomerates in 
SADC, it goes without question that a model that proposes to address the regulation and 
supervision of financial conglomerates in a more effective manner is an attractive option and 
indeed a worthwhile consideration for the SADC regional regulator. 
                                                            
150
 Australian Prudential Authority Working Paper 3 APRA and the Financial System Inquiry (January 2000) 
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3.4 Disadvantages of the Twin Peaks Model 
3.4.1 New wave of Overregulation 
From those from the Unification Model, the Twin Peaks Model with two regulators may 
appear to be an over regulation and as such can be classified as a disadvantage. As has been 
aptly described by one author …‘having to jump to the tune of two units rather than one is 
not something that fills the industry with glee.’154 This overregulation fear may be founded in 
some respects especially as far as the actual number of regulators is concerned but this 
doesn’t necessarily always amount to an ‘overregulation’ in the true because the result in any 
regulatory mechanism is to address prudential and conduct of business regulation. Whether 
such is undertaken in one Unification Model or in the Twin Peaks Model doesn’t in any way 
create a further obligation ‘over and above’ the primary regulatory mandate. Therefore, this 
disadvantage should be understood only as far as it differs from the one-stop shop created by 
the Unification Model.  
Assuming the Twin Peaks Model is recommended for the SADC regional regulator and 
further that the position by Carmichael on the position of the central bank in emerging 
markets is also supported155, then in the SADC context, this disadvantage would not be 
strongly felt because the central banks (which would then be the prudential peaks) have 
always had an integral part in the regulatory structures of the Member States. There would in 
essence be no ‘overregulation’ per day. 
3.4.2 Elimination of Checks and Balances 
Unlike in the case of multiple regulators, only one regulator for market conduct may lead to a 
reduction in the necessary checks and balances. This could result in excessive use of 
powers.156 This is best understood when one starts from the premise of the Silos Model 
                                                            
154
 Quinn J ‘Rainmaker: Twin Peaks regulation gets a poor review’ The Telegraph 31 March 2012 accessed 20 
February 2015 at  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/james-quinn/9178018/Rainmaker-Twin-
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 Carmichael J Regulatory Structure Presentation at Regional Seminar of NBFI’s in East Asia, Bangkok 
September 2002 accessed 25 February 2015 at http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/157129/nbfi-
lac/pdf/03carmichael2.pdf where he submits that central banks in emerging markets should be the prudential 
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156
 Bailey S ‘Super regulator’ Chartered Accountants Journal  December 2010 accessed 20 February 2015 at 
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(which is discussed fully in Chapter 4). The idea is that each ‘industry’ within the financial 
sector will have its own conduct of business regulator. The introduction of a conduct of 
business regulator for the entire financial sector through the Twin Peaks Model can therefore 
appear to be eliminating check and balances that the individual regulators would have vis-à-
vis each other. 
In a discussion of a SADC regulator one needs to be weary of this not only because some 
SADC states have the Silos Model in place and could legitimately raise these concerns; but 
also because the regulator will be tasked with setting conduct of business standards cutting 
across a spectrum of countries with such strong and firmly rooted disparities that any careless 
attempt at a compromise may genuinely eliminate checks and balances. 
3.4.3 Regulatory Overlap 
 Conceptually the regulatory overlap is best captured by Briault in the following way: 
 “There is a considerable overlap – both conceptually and in practice – between prudential 
and conduct of business regulation. Both have a close and legitimate interest in the senior 
management of any financial institution subject to both of these types of regulation, in 
particular because of the crucial roles of senior management in setting the “compliance 
culture” of a firm…”157 
 These sentiments were expressed in Briault’s 1999 paper as a response to Taylor’s Twin 
Peaks proposal in 1997. Briault was in support of the UK adopting the Unification Model, 
which it in fact did at the material time. Although it has already been stated that the UK has 
subsequently abandoned this model for the Twin Peaks Model158; this doesn’t make the Twin 
Peaks Model infallible.  
 The best cited example indicating this disadvantage is the Australian situation. The argument 
is correctly so, that the ASIC and the APRA in reality regulate the same entities and often 
require different regulatory requirements which can be cumbersome on the entity.159 An 
example is subsequently cited in relation to the superannuation industry where entities are 
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required to comply with financial service requirements (ASIC) and responsible 
superannuation entity requirements (APRA). 
 This disadvantage is crucial in the determination of the best model for the SADC framework 
because one of the main reasons advanced as a need for a regional regulator and supervisor is 
regulatory overlap among the SADC Member States. However, the current SADC overlap 
doesn’t relate to two arms of regulation administering different requirements over the same 
financial matter; but rather different states with different regulatory matrix seeking adherence 
from the same financial institution over the same matter in a different way. It would be (to 
some extent) going against reason to recommend a regulatory model that will create the same 
problem it was put in place to address.  
3.5 CASE STUDY  
3.5.1 SOUTH AFRICA 
3.5.1.1 Introduction 
Before the introduction and implementation of the Twin Peaks Model in South Africa, the 
South African regulatory framework comprised of multiple government agencies, self 
advisory and oversight committees and self regulatory organisations.160 Although one can 
submit that the model had naturally evolved and aligned itself with the needs of the booming 
post-apartheid South African economy, its roots can be correctly traced to the De Kock 
Commission’s report of 1985.161 It is however not clear from the structure whether one can 
classify it as the partial Unification Model similar to Botswana or whether it takes a more 
complicated stance. It has been suggested that the old South African model loosely took after 
the United Kingdom and Canadian models.162 
The main agencies responsible for the regulation and supervision of the South African 
financial sector (pre-twin peaks) were the Bank Supervision Department (BSD) of the South 
African Reserve Bank (SARB), tasked to regulate and supervise banks163; the Financial 
Services Board of South Africa (FSB-SA) with the role to regulate and supervise most non-
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 Financial Stability Board Peer Review of South of South Africa (5 February 2013). 
161
 Kantor B S ‘The De Kock Commission Report: A Monetarist Perspective’ (1986) 54(1)  The South African 
Journal of Economics 94 ; See also Address by Governor of the South African Reserve Bank one Dr. C Stals in 
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bank financial institutions and securities markets. Thus far, the model appears to resemble the 
partial Unification Model, however, a further National Credit Regulator (NCR) under the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), is responsible for  regulating  the market conduct 
aspects of granting of consumer credit by all credit providers.164   
From as early as September 1992 discussions focusing on the possible restructuring of the 
financial services regulators and supervisors in South Africa commenced.165 In 2007, 
government launched a formal review of the regulatory system. It was however only in 2009 
after the Global Financial crisis hit in 2008 that the deliberations gained momentum.   
Ultimately in February 2011 the Ministry of Finance published a document titled A Safer 
Financial Sector to Serve South Africa Better166 (known also as the Red Book)  taking into 
account the lessons learnt from  the crisis and setting out the new ‘South African’ Twin Peaks 
Model. Although the rest of this research refers to this model as simply the Twin Peaks 
Model, it is perhaps vital to note that the model to be adopted by South Africa is not the twin 
peaks in its purest form. Naturally, it is a permutation and modification altered to best suit the 
circumstances of the state but undoubtedly, the core and marrow of the new South African 
regulatory framework is Twin Peaks.  
It came as no surprise when on the 22 February 2012 in his budget speech the Minister of 
Finance Pravin Gordhan said; 
“As announced last year, we intend to shift towards a twin peaks system for financial 
regulation, where we separate prudential from market conduct supervision of the financial 
sector. Consultations will continue this year, with a view to tabling legislation in early 
2013.”167 
The first draft legislation guided by the fifteen cabinet approved principles168 was tabled in 
December 2013 as the Financial Sector Regulation Bill (hereinafter FSR Bill) and the second 
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draft was tabled in December 2014. Consultations with relevant stakeholders are still on-
going with the deadline for comments being the 2 March 2015. 169 
It must be categorically stated and clearly understood that the Twin Peaks Model in South 
Africa has not been fully implemented to form a part of the fabric of South African law. The 
author merely uses South Africa as indication of how a SADC country which has embraced 
this model intends to implement it. In his 2015 budget speech, the current Minister of 
Finance, Nhlanhla Nene after highlighting the need for the reform, informed that nation that 
the bill on the Twin Peaks Model will be tabled during the year.170 
The driving force behind South Africa’s new regulatory mechanisms is the desire to shift 
away from a fragmented regulatory approach and adopt a more robust and comprehensive 
regulatory system that will reduce the possibility of regulatory arbitrage. Secondly and 
arguably more importantly, the twin peaks was deemed suitable because South Africa’s 
financial sector didn’t have consumer interests at heart where ‘wealthier, urban customers 
tend to get a wider range of more suitable products, while poorer and rural customers may get 
inappropriate or expensive financial services or none at all.’171 
3.5.1.2 Regulation under the Twin Peaks Model 
As highlighted above one of the main reasons for the adoption of the Twin Peaks Model in 
South Africa was the global financial crisis of 2008. Although South Africa’s financial 
system ‘weathered the storm’, the ripple effects of the financial crisis led to one million job 
cuts in the Republic.172 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
20 March 2015 at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/FSR2014/2014%2012%2012%20Response%20document.pdf 
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The Republic of South Africa through the guidance of President Jacob Zuma has 
subsequently undertaken commitments aimed at strengthening financial stability and overall 
growth of the economy post- the global financial crisis.173 The main commitment areas are: 
A stronger regulatory framework 
This is undeniably the commitment that has given rise to the birth of the Twin Peaks Model. 
This important commitment can also be noted in South Africa G20 Comprehensive Growth 
Plan where it springs from the thirst of financial stability as an overall mandate.174 Emphasis 
is also made on the need for this new phenomenon to embrace macro-prudential tools of 
regulation. 
Effective Supervision 
Like love and marriage a strong regulatory framework cannot be divorced from effective 
supervision. This commitment therefore complements and supplements the need for a 
stronger regulatory framework. More importantly, South Africa has taken the position that 
this commitment should encompass domestic and international coordination of regulators.175 
This immediately suggests that a SADC regional regulatory and supervisory authority could 
genuinely be in the contemplation of the SADC Member States. Although it would be a 
distortion of this commitment to stretch it as far as suggesting a regional regulator, the need 
for international coordination is appreciated. 
Addressing systemic issues and crisis resolution 
The strong regulatory framework and effective supervision would inevitably address issues of 
systemic stability and crisis resolution. One can perhaps argue that this commitment is given 
its own place as a need to emphasise the macro-prudential approach to regulation.176 The 
South African National Treasury states that this commitment seeks to ensure that; ‘…the 
                                                            
173
 National Treasury A Safer Financial Sector to serve South Africa Better (23 February 2011) accessed 20 
March 2015 at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2011/A%20safer%20financial%20sector%20to%2
0serve%20South%20Africa%20better.pdf (hereinafter NT ‘A Safer Financial Sector to serve South Africa Better’) 
174
 Australia G20 2014 Comprehensive Growth Strategy: South Africa accessed 20 March 2015 at 
https://g20.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/g20_comprehensive_growth_strategy_south_africa.pdf . 
175
 NT A Safer Financial Sector to serve South Africa Better 4 
176
 See footnote 20 in Financial Stability Board Peer Review of South Africa accessed 20 March 2015 at 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_130205.pdf . 
 
 
 
 
 P
a
g
e
4
3
 
costs of a financial institution‘s failure are as small as possible, and that such a failure does 
not affect the broader financial system- macro-prudential stance.’177(Emphasis mine) 
International Assessment and Peer Review 
This speaks to the need to regularly ensure that the regulatory and supervisory structures are 
in tune with international standards. In January 2013 South Africa amended its regulations to 
align then with Basel III requirements.178 South Africa also undertakes peer reviews such as 
the one issued by the financial stability board in February 2013.179 
Coupled with these four main commitments are policy objectives which are deliberately 
structured to enable a smooth transition into the Twin Peaks Model. The four main policy 
objectives are financial stability, consumer protection and market conduct, expanding access 
through financial inclusion and, combating financial crime.180 
Under the Twin Peaks Model South Africa will have two main regulators; on the one hand is 
the prudential authority responsible for the safety and soundness of banks, insurance 
companies and other financial institutions, and on the other is the financial sector conduct 
authority mandated to oversee the manner in which financial services firms conduct their 
businesses and treat consumers.181  
From a cursory glance one can easily discern that the above mentioned policy objectives are 
aligned with the new regulatory reform (i.e. Twin Peaks). The first policy objective on 
financial stability gels in with the prudential regulator making emphasis on the need for a 
macro-prudential approach to regulation. The need for macro-prudential regulation also 
appreciates that a crisis in one part of the financial sector may affect the entire economy and 
many other economies (such as the global financial crisis of 2008). 
The second policy objective of consumer protection and market conduct is also in tune with 
the Twin Peaks Model’s second peak of market conduct regulation. This objective springs 
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from South Africa’s realisation that historically there has been an inherent neglect on market 
conduct regulation.182 
The Financial Sector Regulation Bill (FSR Bill)183starts by setting out the mandate which 
naturally seeks to cover all issues from financial stability to consumer protection. The phrase 
that crisply captures the regulatory proposal states that the bill seeks ‘…to establish 
authorities to supervise and regulate, on a consistent and comprehensive basis, the provision 
of financial products and financial services in South Africa...’184 
The prudential authority (Chapter 3 FSR Bill) will be housed within the South African 
Reserve Bank and will work within the administration of the Reserve Bank. It will focus on 
both micro and macro prudential aspects of regulation.185  The objective of the said prudential 
authority is outlined in Section 28 of the FSR Bill as being to ‘enhance the safety and 
soundness of financial institutions that provide financial products, market infrastructures or 
payment systems.’ 
Section 29 then outlines the functions of the prudential authority which include assisting the 
Reserve Bank in financial stability issues and cooperating with the Financial Service Conduct 
Authority and the National Credit Regulator. The Governor of the Reserve Bank is to appoint 
a Deputy Governor and the Chief Executive Officer of the Prudential Authority for a term not 
exceeding ten years (i.e. two five year terms).186 
The Financial Service Board will be transformed into the Financial Sector Conduct Authority 
(Chapter 4 FSR Bill). Section 52 sets out the objective of the Financial Sector Conduct 
Authority generally as to protect financial customers. Its subsections give a further account 
on what this sought for protection entails. It is said to include treating customers fairly and 
giving educational programs in a bid to improve financial literacy.187   In essence Section 52 
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http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/FSR2014/2014%2012%2011%20FSRB%20including%20Cons
equential%20Amendments%20and%20Memo%20of%20Objects.pdf.  
185
 Dixion J ‘Twin Peaks Legislation near its Final Stages’ FSB Focus (First Quarter 2014). 
186
 Section 31 and 32 of the FSR Bill. 
187
 Section 52(a) and (c) of the FSR Bill. 
 
 
 
 
 P
a
g
e
4
5
 
encapsulates the idea that market conduct regulation should minimise financial institutions’ 
possibility to exploit customers or treat them in an unfair manner.188 
Similar to Section 29 with the prudential authority Section 53 outlines the functions that the 
conduct authority should perform. Like the prudential authority it is tasked with coordinating 
and cooperating with the Prudential Authority and the National Credit Regulator.189 
For its governance structure the Minister of Finance shall appoint in terms of Section 57(1) 
an appropriate person to be the Commissioner to the Financial Sector Conduct Authority. 
Thereafter the Minister must appoint at least two but no more than four Deputy 
Commissioners.190 
Back to the proposed SADC model it must be noted that since the mechanisms set to churn 
and channel the twin peaks smoothly into the South African financial sector have not been 
started it is difficult for one to make an assessment of the twin peaks’ practical advantages in 
a Southern African context. The assessment may however be made from the current 
theoretical stance and from the reasons advanced by South Africa in adopting the twin peaks. 
3.6 Conclusion 
The Twin Peaks is certainly an attractive regulatory framework for SADC for many reasons. 
In the first instance it makes a clear distinction between the prudential wing and conduct of 
business aspects which the last global financial crisis has shown require separate and equally 
dedicated agencies. This is of course the selling point of this model especially vis-à-vis the 
Unification Model which seeks to have the two important regulatory aspects under one roof. 
Independence 
As the author has tried to highlight throughout this research, independence is not isolation. 
The idea of a regulatory authority being independent should not be seen as equivalent to a 
suggestion that the regulatory authority should be isolated from the entire financial sector it 
wishes to regulate and/or supervise or from other arms of government. 
In fact the regulator should work hand in hand with the arms of government in the fulfilment 
of its regulatory functions. The Twin Peaks Model, at least as far as the South African 
example goes, is relatively independent. Although the FSR Bill sets out the main objectives 
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and the functions (as seen in sections 28 and 29 with prudential authority and 52 and 53 with 
conduct authority), it doesn’t go to the extent of dictating the actual regulations (i.e. 
legislative instrument)  that should be imposed. So although the legislative arm has provided 
a platform and guidance, it has not gone as far as dictating and effectively micro managing 
the entity. 191 
Although the need for legislative oversight cannot be overemphasised, the words of 
Woodrow Wilson must always underscore a discussion on independence. He is quoted as 
saying that … 
“There is some scandal and discomfort, but infinite advantage, in having every affair of 
administration subjected to the test of constant examination on the part of the assembly which 
represents the nation.”192 
The South African Twin Peaks Model best embraces this. There is enough scandal and 
discomfort as there is advantage in the manner in which the drafters have sought to erode and 
protect its regulatory independence. 
A questionable relationship exists between the Governor of the Reserve Bank and the Chief 
Executive Officer of the Prudential Authority. The CEO is actually appointed a Deputy 
Governor first before being effectively ‘seconded’ to the prudential authority. It is humbly 
submitted that questionable as this may appear prima facie, the central bank and the 
prudential authority should not be viewed as separate entities but one as a subset of the other. 
In the earlier discussion in this chapter, a note is made on the role of the central bank in the 
Twin Peaks Model. Further, the discussion authoritatively suggests that if the Twin Peaks 
Model was to be adopted in an emerging economy, the prudential peak should be kept in the 
central bank.  
Although one cannot convincingly argue that this was the idea behind having the prudential 
peak housed in the South African Reserve Bank, this would certainly hold as any argument 
advanced for the SADC financial sector whose composition is mainly emerging markets. The 
direct link between the Governor and the CEO therefore causing no erosion, at least as far as 
                                                            
191
 Quintyn M & Taylor MW ‘Should Financial Sector Regulators be Independent? ‘(2004) IMF Economic Issues 
No 32 (hereafter Quintyn & Taylor (2004) accessed 20 March 2015 at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/issues/issues32/#1  (note that article has no pages).   
192
International Monetary Fund Working Paper, The Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors: Principle 
and Practice (December 2005) 22. 
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the SADC model is concerned, on the independence of the prudential regulatory authority. 
This is because the central bank is and should be the prudential peak. 
If any argument is made at all it should be that this relationship enhances accountability on 
the part of the prudential authority as the Governor will ensure that the CEO carries out his 
functions.  
The political argument can of course never be overlooked. In some SADC states (such as 
Malawi) the Governor is a political office and could therefore be unduly influenced. 
Similarly, the Commissioner of the conduct authority is also appointed by a political office 
being the Minister. The Minister also appoints the Deputy Commissioners.  
Madise submits that during times of crises undue political interference has worsened the 
situation by weakening financial regulatory structures.193 The immediate concern in this 
particular instance is that the regulatory structures that could be weakened are built on 
political bedrock with two political figures appointing the management of the regulatory 
agencies.  
 Accountability  
The first accountability argument on behalf of the Twin Peaks Model has been made above 
when addressing the relationship between the Governor and the CEO of the prudential peak.   
The second argument relates to the legally imposed coordination between the two peaks. The 
drafters of the FSR Bill took a deliberate step to include the coordination and cooperation of 
the two peaks as an indication of the importance this has in the accountability of the two 
peaks.194 The prudential authority is therefore able to keep checks and balances on the 
conduct authority peaks and inhibits in going astray under the misconception that they are not 
accountable to anyone. Further if any conflict persists, it is to be formally resolved by the 
Council of Financial Regulators.195  
This position is not only manifested as between the authorities, in fact Section 31 (2) and 
Section 57 (8) serve as ‘internal accountability provisions’ for both the Prudential Authority 
                                                            
193
 Madise S Developing an Independent Regulatory Framework for the Financial Sector in Malawi (unpublished 
LLM thesis, University of the Western Cape 2010-2011) 19. 
194
 Parliamentary Accountability is discussed in depth by Quintyn and Taylor in the International Monetary 
Fund Working Paper, The Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors: Principle and Practice (December 
2005) 20. 
195
 NT A Safer Financial Sector to serve South Africa Better 29.  
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and the Financial Sector Conduct Authority. With the former, the Governor and the CEO 
must agree on performance measures that assess the CEO’s performance. Similarly, the 
Minister and the Commissioners must reach a similar performance indicator agreement that 
will inevitable ensure that they are accountable whilst performing their duties. 
In the end, the twin peaks has many benefits and could certainly be a worthwhile 
consideration in the development of a regional regulatory structure for SADC. Chapter 5 
discusses in more detail how it could be moulded to provide guidance for the regional 
regulator. In the next chapter the discussion is on the Silos Model. The discussion will follow 
the same tangent as the Unification Model and Twin Peaks Model. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE SILOS MODEL 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The two previous chapters discussed the Unification Model and the Twin Peaks Model 
respectively. Although in reality the two forms of regulation and supervision are not similar 
they at least share the underlying notion that regulation is of the entire financial sector and 
don’t often go further to disintegrate the different industries within the financial sector. In 
fact one of the supporters of the Unification Model expressly states that ‘a regulatory system 
that presupposes a clear separation between banking, securities and insurance is no longer the 
best way to regulate the financial system in which such distinctions are becoming 
increasingly irrelevant.’196 
It is against the backdrop of this bold statement that the silo model is introduced. In contrast 
to the above position, the Silos Model or vertical model by its very nature denotes a clear 
separation between the different industries forming the financial sector.197 This type of model 
is often referred to as the traditional model and as the name suggests, all subsequent models 
have sprung from it and have sought to address its weaknesses. This has already been noted 
throughout this paper with the case studies that indicate that the different countries initially 
followed this regime. 
Its roots can perhaps be traced to the American system which to date still has the idea of 
multiple regulators at both the federal and state level. One Huang Hui who writes with the 
aim to recommend one of the regulatory models to China notes that the United States has the 
Silos Model because of its chequered history.198 Huang submits that in the aftermath of the 
Great Depression of 1923 new restrictive measures such as the Glass Steagall Act (Banking 
Act of 1933) were introduced segmenting financial markets and confining financial 
institutions to specific business lines.  
The result, which undoubtedly forms the bedrock of the Silos Model of financial regulation, 
is that the business of banks, securities and insurances were separated from each other and 
                                                            
196
 Llewellyn DT Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation and Supervision: The Basic Issues (2006) 19. 
197
 Zimbabwe Economic Policy Analysis and Research Unit Financial Regulation and Supervision in Zimbabwe: 
An Evaluation of Adequacy and Options (2014) accessed 10 April 2015 at 
http://elibrary.acbfpact.org/acbf/collect/acbf/index/assoc/HASH3ed8.dir/Financial%20Regulation.pdf  . 
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each allocated a corresponding statute. Subsequently, the regulation of these ‘apparently’ 
clear and distinct business lines was also kept separate.  
Although the idea of each sector having a regulator sounds neat and clean, the reality and 
practicality of it can be very tasking and is the main reason why countries either shy away 
from this model or have changed to a different model. Indeed it has been suggested that the 
regulatory structures of countries that have the Silos Model in place are fragmented and 
convoluted and often develop through a non-systematic, ad-hoc, trial and error process 
throughout the years.199   
4.2 What is the Silos Model? 
The model has also been referred to as the vertical model, institutional model and as noted 
the traditional model. As the names suggest, the model envisions a financial sector made up 
of ‘silos’ forming the different industries or defined along the ‘institutional’ lines which are 
represented by the various financial institutions within the sector.200 For its part, the term 
‘vertical’ arises as contrast to the unified or ‘horizontal’ model which encompasses all the 
sectors within on unified umbrella. For purposes of this discussion the terms used to refer to 
the Silos Model, represent the same ideology and are therefore used interchangeably. The 
above merely gives one the meaning of the names attached to this model, but the ultimate 
question is; what is it? 
This is a form of financial regulation and supervision over each single category or each single 
segment of the financial sector through the use of different authorities or agencies responsible 
for each unit.201 Consequently, each and every participant in the financial sector in need of 
regulation and supervision must fall within one of the ‘categories’ or ‘segments’ streamlined 
for regulation. In essence a firm’s legal status determines which regulator oversees its 
activities in terms of both safety and soundness and conduct of business.202 
The main ‘traditional and vertical silos’ are the banking sector, the insurance sector and the 
securities. By extension or at least as far as the definition goes one would imagine a country 
                                                            
199
 The PEW Economic Policy Department Financial Reform Project The International Experience with 
Regulatory Consolidation Briefing Paper #6 (2009). 
200
 Botha  E ‘Financial Regulation and Supervision: Theory and Practice in South Africa’ 10(11) International 
Business and Economic Research Journal 27. 
201
 Di Giorgio G & Di Noia C ‘Financial Market Regulation and Supervision: How Many Peaks for the Euro Area?’ 
(2003) Brooklyn Journal of International Law 4. 
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 Group of Thirty (G30) The Structure of Financial Supervision: Approaches and Challenges in the Global 
Marketplace (2008) accessed 13 April 2015 at 
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would have three regulators responsible for each of the main sectors that have been outlined. 
However, often times this is not the case. Zimbabwe is a SADC country which can correctly 
be classified as embracing the Silos Model with five regulators being the Reserve Bank, the 
Ministry of Finance, the Deposit Protection Corporation, the Securities Exchange 
Commission and the Insurance and Pensions Commission.203 Similarly, China has four 
regulators and supervisors being those responsible for the three main industries together with 
the central bank.204 The case study below of Tanzania is an example of a Silos Model with 
the three main sectors. 
4.3 Advantages of the Silos Model 
4.3.1 Independent Agencies 
Whereas other models have, in some extreme cases such as Malawi, the entire regulatory 
mechanism for the financial sector housed in the central bank creating an avenue for political 
interference; one of the advantages advanced for the Silos Model has been that the regulatory 
agencies are often independent and divorced from political influence.205  The argument has 
been aired, especially in the United States of America where the Silos Model is deeply 
rooted, that the independent bureaucrats are free from electoral battles and can therefore 
dedicate their valuable time to developing skills and building expertise that can effectively 
regulate the intricate details of the regulatory areas.206 
The applicability of this advantage in the SADC context creates some difficulty prima facie. 
In the first instance SADC is an inter-governmental entity and therefore has an inherent 
characteristic of political influence. By birth, SADC is a political being.207 Consequently, it is 
difficult to imagine a politically founded and a politically driven unit such as SADC taking 
deliberate steps to allow external independent entities to regulate its financial sector at a 
regional level.  This doesn’t however erode the value of independence in the Silos Model. 
                                                            
203
 Zimbabwe Economic Policy Analysis and Research Unit Financial Regulation and Supervision in Zimbabwe: 
An Evaluation of Adequacy and Options  (2014) accessed 10 April 2015 at 
http://elibrary.acbfpact.org/acbf/collect/acbf/index/assoc/HASH3ed8.dir/Financial%20Regulation.pdf. 
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Huang H ‘Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation in China: Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis 
(April 2010) Journal of Corporate Legal Studies 219  221 . 
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 Madise S Developing an Independent Regulatory Framework for the Financial Sector in Malawi (unpublished 
LLM thesis, University of the Western Cape 2010-2011) 19 as he outlines the fear of political influence in 
Malawi’s Financial Regulation 
206
 Gadinis S ‘From Independence to Politics in Financial Regulation’ (2013) (101) California Law Review 327 
330. 
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 See the brief history of SADC on the SADC website accessed 18 April 2015 at http://www.sadc.int/about-
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Upon a more comprehensive examination it is submitted that SADC may genuinely reap 
from this advantage if correctly proposed. The SADC political influence should not be 
allowed to extend to the internal structure of the regulatory mechanisms. Simply, in order to 
reap from the benefits of independent authorities in the SADC context, the SADC Member 
States should be the political driving force behind the formation of independent entities to 
regulate their financial sector. The political influence should be allowed to permeate only to 
the extent that it gives life to the idea of independent entities. In any event, which political 
agenda would a regional regulator pursue? It would be a devastating set back for the entire 
region if a regional regulator was introduced and in each state it pursued a national political 
agenda. 
In the end it is important to appreciate the different dynamics the idea of independent 
agencies may bring to SADC. It is also vital to note this when one makes an assessment of 
the independence of a regional regulator. 
4.3.2 Highly Specialised Regulation 
Since each and every sector has its own regulator, as the sector develops and adopts more 
intricate methods of operation so does the regulator.208 This is unlike the unified and Twin 
Peaks Models where one needs to be jack-of-all-trades and in so doing a regulator needs to 
keep up with all the developing trends in the various sectors. This can end up in a situation 
where only one aspect of regulation is addressed effectively at the expense of the other as 
highlighted in the disadvantages of the Unification Model in Chapter 2. 
In the SADC context the importance of this advantage can not be overstated. The very need 
for a regional regulator stems from the idea that the financial services sector is not only 
delicate but so deeply intertwined that regional oversight is required. It would be a dream 
come true for SADC to not only have a regional regulator but one with highly specialised 
personnel to be able to address the ever-emerging issues associated with the various segments 
of the financial sector.  
Nevertheless, it is submitted that the practicality of this advantage also needs to be 
considered. An aim to have highly specialised regulation is fair and indeed desirable. One 
should be cautious however not to vouch for highly specialised within the Silos Model to the 
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(2003) Brooklyn Journal of International Law 4 which argues that highly specialised regulation and supervision 
can lead to reduced costs of regulation. 
 
 
 
 
 P
a
g
e
5
3
 
extent that such regulation will deepen barriers between the different industries within the 
financial sector. Therefore although the Silos Model appreciates that each sector is a stand-
alone, it might cause a practical difficulty if the idea of highly separated authorities is directly 
applied to the SADC context where regional integration is pursued. 
4.3.3 Constructive Competition 
This is a very delicate advantage and one should tread carefully when advancing it. Its evil 
twin sister is noted below in the disadvantages to the model. On a positive note though, 
having multiple regulators increases healthy competition between the regulators and naturally 
the services provided are improved to best suit the needs and circumstances of each sector.209 
This is closely connected to the above advantage of highly specialised regulation which is in 
reality a direct consequence of constructive and healthy competition. Undoubtedly once a 
regulator has a competitor, they will strive to improve and specialise its services in order to 
fully satisfy its customers. Hence, constructive competition begets highly specialised 
regulation. 
By a similar token if SADC was to adopt a Silos Model for its regional regulatory structure 
then the healthy competition would exist between the different industries giving birth to clean 
efficient and cost effective ways of regulation. This of course may be cumbersome if one 
company has to adhere to highly specialised regulation in two or three industry-specific 
regulators within the Silos Model. 
4.4 Disadvantages of the Silos Model 
4.4.1 Race to the Bottom 
This disadvantage is what the author describes as the evil twin sister to constructive 
competition. For its part, the position is that such competition between the regulators can 
have adverse effects since it will breed a need for there to be a scramble between the 
regulators in order to try and get as many financial institutions as possible under its purview. 
Naturally, the regulator with the less stringent rules will attract the biggest clientele pool 
since strict regulations are sometimes viewed as suppressing bigger risks and ultimately 
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bigger returns. In such pursuit, a regulator, which is usually funded by levies from 
‘costumers’ may relax its regulations to try and become very profitable.210  
For SADC the idea of the race to the bottom and its possible ramifications is truly a matter of 
concern. A banking regulator for example that seeks to loosen or lower its regulations in a bid 
to attract as many banks can lead to a calamity that won’t only affect its sector but may very 
well ripple to other segments of the financial services matrix. 
4.4.2 Financial Conglomerates 
The emergence of financial conglomerates presents by far the biggest shortcoming for the 
Silos Model.211  This is one of the reasons why the supporters of the Unification Model have 
succeeded to such a great extent in the era where such entities are booming.212 The challenge 
results where one company or group operates across various sectors of the financial sector.  If 
for instance a group of companies operate across the banking, insurance and securities sector 
the result is that the group is required to comply and be supervised by three different 
regulators within the Silos Model. 
One of the benefits that had been advanced on behalf of the Unification Model is that it 
would be able to embrace the growing rate of financial conglomerates in Southern Africa. 
Several examples such as the Old Mutual Group, First National Bank and the Barclays/ABSA 
Group are given in Chapter 2 to strengthen arguments in favour of the Unification Model. 
The converse can be said for the Silos Model and the existence of financial conglomerates in 
SADC. Although being a stretch of the imagination, one might say that if SADC was to adopt 
the Silos Model then the financial conglomerates would only have to adhere to the demands 
of the industry specific regulator once and not each time in each country. Simply, the current 
situation is such that a financial conglomerate involved in banking, insurance and securities 
wishing to penetrate the Zimbabwean and Tanzanian markets would have to comply with the 
regulations and supervisory standards for at least six regulators in the two jurisdictions. The 
adoption of the Silos Model in the entire SADC could narrow this to three. 
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4.4.3 Regulatory Arbitrage 
The existence of various regulators can also lead to financial institutions ‘racing to the 
bottom’ in that they would then choose a regulator that best suits them and enables them to 
make the largest profit. Consequently, a financial conglomerate will deliberately move its 
operations to a sector that has the most lax regulations.213 The idea of regulatory arbitrage can 
be fully embraced when dealing with decentralised financial conglomerates as opposed to 
integrated financial conglomerates.214 One Amir Licht writing on the regulatory arbitrage 
affecting the international securities market notes that one securities transaction may be 
subject to different legal regimes in which case should one country fail to curb insider 
trading, insiders could channel their trade to that market and frustrate the efforts of the other 
countries.215 
By the same token if one of the regulatory agencies within a silos-style model presents a 
more unperturbed approach to regulation and supervision, it will be in correct estimation of 
any financial conglomerate to divert its trading activities significantly in the direction of a 
more favourable regulator. The consequences of this diversion can be grave and therefore this 
disadvantage should not be ignored when dealing with SADC and the idea of a regional 
regulator. 
The key distinction between regulatory arbitrage and ‘the race to the bottom’ discussed above 
is the beneficiaries of each of the disadvantages. Whereas the race to the bottom is a pursuit 
by the regulators to make the regulations lax and make a profit, regulatory arbitrage is the 
financial institutions shifting their trading activities to a more relaxed regulator to enable 
them to take bugger unsubstantiated risks and make a profit. The regulators subject to 
regulatory arbitrage may not have necessarily gone out of their way to lure clients in their 
direction by making lax regulations. 
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4.5 CASE STUDY 
4.5.1 TANZANIA 
4.5.1.1 Introduction 
The turn of the 20th century saw the introduction of the formal supply of money in 
Tanganyika (now Mainland Tanzania) when it became a German East African Colony 
together with Rwanda and Burundi.216 At this time the German East African Company was 
managing the money supply in the colony and by extension one can suggest that this 
amounted to regulation and supervision although in its coarsest state.217The German 
government subsequently took over this role of administering the then German East African 
currency being the Rupees.218 
The end of the First World War and the fall of the German Empire through the Treaty of 
Versailles saw the German Territory of Tanganyika being given to the British Empire which 
introduced the East African Rupee of other British colonies (Kenya and Uganda) into 
Tanganyika.219 Soon thereafter in 1919 the East African Currency Board (EACB) was  
established with its aim being to supply and control the circulation of money and the currency 
which in 1921 changed to the Pound-Shilling.220 At this time three commercial banks 
(National and Grindlays Bank, Standard Bank and Barclays Bank) had replaced the old 
German banks and were operating in Tanganyika. 221In the years leading to independence the 
Indian Bank of Baroda and Bank of India also began operations in Tanganyika. Although 
mention is made of the EACB, it has been suggested that no true regulation took place in this 
era and the ‘big three’ commercial banks merely used the Tanzanian banking system as a 
                                                            
216
 Lwiza DRB & Nwankwo S ‘Market-driven transformation of the banking sector in Tanzania’ (2002) (20) (1) 
International Journal of Bank Marketing 38 39. 
217
 Sandrock JE ‘A Monetary History of German East Africa’ accessed 15 April 2015 at 
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conduit for transferring local mobilised funds to investments abroad.222 The sad reality was 
therefore that the financial needs of the people of Tanzania were not on their agenda and were 
therefore inadequately addressed. 
9th December 1961 marks the independence of Mainland Tanzania and a time of great 
uncertainty for the business community that was unsure of the consequences of the new 
regime. Naturally, the banking system suffered a blow. In the interim, the EACB continued 
its ‘central bank functions’ to the former colonies.223 In an attempt to give guidance to the 
newly formed states a commission was set up from the Central Bank of the Federal Republic 
of Germany headed by one Dr Blumenthal who recommended that the EACB be a regional 
central bank with each state having its own smaller central bank.224 
The political climate at the time dismissed the idea of a regional central bank however 
pursuant to this report in 1965 the Bank of Tanzania (BoT) a was officially established 
through the Bank of Tanzania Act.225 Unfortunately before any true assessment could be done 
on how the bank had carried out its regulatory and supervisory duties the Arusha declaration 
was proclaimed in 1967.226The Arusha Declaration set in motion a socialist egalitarian 
agenda nationalising all commercial banks and forcing the BoT to realign its duties to the 
new dynamics.227 The nationalisation of the commercial banks led to the establishment of one 
wholly government owned bank, the National Bank of Commerce.228The harsh realities of the 
Arusha declaration on the financial sector eventually dawned on the government of the day 
                                                            
222
 Lwiza DRB & Nwankwo S ‘Market-driven transformation of the banking sector in Tanzania’ (2002) (20) (1) 
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and ultimately in 1978 the Bank of Tanzania Act was amended enabling it to start regulatory 
and supervisory duties.229 
A new era for the Tanzanian financial sector emerged in 1986 when President Mwinyi 
assumed office and introduced an economic reform program which essentially sought to 
dismantle the structures that Arusha had developed.230 In such pursuit, the Nyirabu 
Commission was set up in 1988 whose recommendations proposed a market based financial 
sector and strategies to undo the harm of the socialist regime.231 
One such achievement was the enactment of the Banking and Financial Institutions Act of 
1991 and the subsequent amendment of the Bank of Tanzania Act of 1995 for banking 
regulation. Both Acts were subsequently amended in 2006 and the current regulatory 
structure discussed below reflects the subsequent amendments. Tanzania has also taken 
strides to adhere to the international Basel standards and is currently implementing Basel 
II.232 No decision has been take on the prospects, adoption or implementation of Basel III in 
Tanzania.233 
4.4.1.2 Regulation under the Silos Model 
One of the main reasons given for Tanzania’s adoption of the Silos Model is the disjointed 
nature of their financial sector. This lack of linkages explains, at least to some degree, why 
the country’s circumstances were best suited for the Silos Model.234 Although this has not 
been explicitly noted, it is submitted that another reason for the adoption of the Silos Model 
is because the different industries within the financial sector emerged at different times. The 
banking sector as an example has been in operation arguably from the early days of the 
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German Empire when the insurance and securities sector were unknown to Tanzania (then 
Tanganyika).235 
Tanzania has its silos along the three main traditional lines of banking, insurance and capital 
markets and securities. For a better appreciation, the three industries are individually 
addressed below. 
Banking  
As at 2013, the Tanzanian banking sector had 45 reporting banks divided into four categories 
targeting different markets and different clientele.236 The regulation and supervision of banks 
and financial institutions237 in Tanzania can be found within the parameters of the Bank of 
Tanzania Act of 2006(BoT Act), the Banking and Financial Institutions Act of 2006 (BAFIA 
Act) together with the Companies Act of 2002.  
More supplementary regulations exist within the framework of the BAFIA Act such as the  
Risk Management Guidelines for Banks and Financial Institutions of 2008, the Outsourcing 
Guidelines for Banks and Financial Institutions of 2008; the Banking and Financial 
Institutions (Liquidity Management) Regulations of 2008; the Banking and Financial 
Institutions (Capital Adequacy) Regulations of  2008; the Banking and Financial Institutions 
(Microfinance Companies and Micro Credit Activities) Regulations of  2005; and the 
Banking and Financial Institutions (Licensing) Regulations of 2008.238 
The BoT Act establishes the Bank of Tanzania under section 4. It then enunciates its 
regulatory and supervisory functions in Section 6. This same preposition is captured in 
section 4 of the BAFIA Act which gives the BoT all powers relating to licensing, regulation 
and supervision. The immediate and perhaps inevitable question that arises is; what exactly is 
the relationship between the BoT Act and the BAFIA Act as far as the regulation and 
supervision of the Tanzanian banking sector is concerned?  
                                                            
235
 Lwiza DRB & Nwankwo S ‘Market-driven transformation of the banking sector in Tanzania’ (2002) (20) (1) 
International Journal of Bank Marketing 38 39. 
236
 Kapinga WB, Khalid RA & Kapinga K W ‘Tanzania’ in Putnis J (ed) The Banking Regulation Review (2013) 773. 
237
 Which in term s of the Banking and Financial Institutions Act of 2006 means an entity engaged in the 
business of banking, but limited as to size, locations served, or permitted activities, as prescribed by the Bank 
or required by the terms and conditions of its licence, the Banking and Financial Institutions Act was accessed 
16 April 2015 at https://www.bot-tz.org/BankingSupervision/BAFIA2006.pdf . 
238
 Kapinga WB, Khalid RA & Kapinga K W ‘Tanzania’ in Putnis J (ed) The Banking Regulation Review (2013) 773 
774. 
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The Preamble to the BAFIA Act stipulates that the Act provides for the comprehensive 
regulation of banks and financial institutions and the regulation and supervision of activities 
of savings and credit cooperatives societies and schemes with the view to maintaining the 
safety and soundness of the financial system inter alia. Meanwhile the BoT Act reinforces 
the position of the Bank of Tanzania in its position as the regulator and supervisor of all 
banks and financial institutions. One cannot attempt to make the acts subsets of each other 
but in fact; the two statutes supplement and complement each other in the regulation and 
supervision of banks and financial institutions in Tanzania. 
This argument is further substantiated by the fact that there seems to be no power dynamic 
between the two Acts. The Governor, Deputy Governors and Board of Directors are all 
appointed by the BoT Act under sections 8 and 9 respectively and the BAFIA act doesn’t in 
any way challenge their positions or authority. It is however worthy to note that the Governor 
and Deputy Governor are both appointed by the President. The Governor becomes the 
chairman to the board which has the permanent secretaries of the Treasury departments of 
Tanzania and Zanzibar occupying ex officio posts. These appointments naturally bring into 
question the political influence this might have on the independence of the central bank in 
carrying out its regulatory and supervisory duties. 
The government’s influence on the regulation of the banking sector is not peculiar as this is 
the lifeline of the economy. Such influence shouldn’t be allowed to culminate into negative 
political influence and the advancing of political agendas at the expense of the proper 
regulation of the banking sector. This is especially important in a country that has a 
chequered history of excessive political influence in the socialist period.239 
Insurance 
Section 5 of the Insurance Act240 establishes the Tanzanian Insurance Authority (TIRA). The 
authority is tasked with the responsibility of coordinating policy and other matters relating to 
insurance in the United Republic of Tanzania.241 Its main objectives include the formulation 
of standards in the conduct of the business of insurance which shall be observed by insurers, 
                                                            
239
 The Arusha Declaration of 1967 set in motion the socialist agenda. See Tanzania Mainland 50 Years of 
Independence: A Review of the Role and Functions of the Bank of Tanzania (June 2011). 
240
 Accessed 16 April 2015 at 
http://www.tanzania.go.tz/egov_uploads/documents/The_Insurance_Act,_2009_%28Act_No_sw.pdf  
241
 Section 5(2) Insurance Act of 2009. 
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brokers and agents.242 Further TIRA aims to effectively supervise and monitor insurers, 
brokers and agents to comply with the aforementioned standards as required by the Insurance 
Act. For its organisational structure TIRA is headed by the National Insurance Board243 with 
the Commissioner244 and Deputy Commissioner245 of Insurance taking their respective role 
subsequently. Thereafter the entity is divided in several units or divisions ranging from legal 
services to market development. The main units for purposes of this discussion are the 
technical services division and the unit on surveillance and research.246 
The former focuses on the regulatory aspect whereas the latter focuses on supervision. If one 
was to attempt to draw further distinctions one could safely state that the technical services 
unit together with the legal services department addresses the prudential aspect of regulation 
whereas the surveillance and research division in conjunction with the market development 
unit deals with conduct of business. The above submission is made on the strength of the 
roles that each of the units plays at TIRA both individually and collectively. 
The impact of TIRA in Tanzania since its birth in 2009 is noteworthy. As at July 2014 it is 
reported that the number of persons insured in Tanzania, a country with a population of 
45million people was 13%.247 Despite this achievement TIRA continues to embark on a 
nation-wide campaign that seeks to sensitize the public on the need for insurance especially 
car insurance which is said to be a cause of great concern to the nation. An official from 
TIRA interviewed by The Guardian above responded by saying that the deficit with car 
insurance was created in the statute and could thus not be effectively addressed by TIRA 
without Parliamentary intervention to amend the statute.248 On the overall however, TIRA 
reports that the nation has embraced health insurance and its benefits in a promising way.249 
On the question of independence and accountability, the governing structures of TIRA 
represent a more balanced stance. Although both the Commissioner and Deputy 
                                                            
242
 Tanzania Insurance Regulatory Authority website accessed 18 April 2015 at 
http://www.tira.go.tz/?q=objectives.  
243
 Established under section 13 of the Insurance Act of 2009. 
244
 Appointed by the president under section 7 of the Insurance Act of 2009. 
245
 Appointed by the president under section 8 of the Insurance Act of 2009. 
246
 See TIRA website on organisational structure accessed 18 April 2015 at http://www.tira.go.tz/?q=org . 
247
 Andrew F ‘TIRA: 13 Per cent of Tanzanians Covered in insurance services’ The Guardian  14 July 2014 
accessed 18 April 2015 at http://www.ippmedia.com/frontend/index.php?l=69930 . 
248
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accessed 18 April 2015 at http://www.ippmedia.com/frontend/index.php?l=69930. 
249
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Commissioner are appointed by the President, the National Insurance Board has 
representation from all relevant stakeholders. Section 13 provides that of the seven members, 
one shall be from the Tanzanian Insurance Agents Association, another from the Association 
of Tanzanian Insurers, one from the Tanzanian Insurance Brokers Association and three 
additional members that have the required expertise with at least two hailing from the United 
Republic of Tanzania.  Another member of the board also appointed by the Minister is from 
the Attorney General’s Chambers. This representation to depicts a spirit of transparency and 
ultimately an aim to be accountable to the people they wish to serve. 
Capital Markets and Securities 
The Tanzanian Capital Markets and Securities Act (CMSA) was enacted in 1994 establishing 
the Capital Markets and Securities Authority which would promote and facilitate the 
development of an orderly, fair and efficient capital markets and securities in Tanzania.250 
Section 6 of the CMSA establishes the Capital Market and Securities Authority and Section 
10 sets out its general functions. 
 In 1996 after an assessment of the corporate sector demands the Authority adopted a two tier 
equity securities market structure but cautiously only operated one.251 Consequently the Dar 
es Salaam Stock Exchange (DSE) was established in 1996 and started admitting companies in 
1998.  
To date the DSE has 14 domestic-listed companies and 7 cross listed companies with their 
most recent listings being on the 29th December 2014 and the 15th August 2014 
respectively.252At the time the Authority was established there had been seven hundred 
poorly managed parastatals operating in Tanzania with a very small private sector. Currently 
three hundred such parastatals have been privatised with five of them having done so through 
the DSE.253  
Like the other regulatory and supervisory authorities the Capital Markets and Securities has a 
governing structure established by section 6(3) of the CMSA. Although the poorly drafted 
                                                            
250
 Preamble to the Tanzanian Capital Market and Securities Act accessed 18 April 2015 at http://www.cmsa-
tz.org/popup/pdf/THE%20CAPITAL%20MARKETS%20AND%20SECURITIES%20ACT.pdf  
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statute makes no specific reference to a governing board, it is understood that the ‘authority’ 
it seeks to establish under section 6(3) is indeed a governing body.254 To this end it consists 
of four ex officio members seconded from the treasury, BoT, registrar of companies and the 
Attorney General’s chambers. Other members include a chairman appointed by the president 
and the chief executive officer of the regulatory authority. 
It is perhaps crucial at this point to highlight the fact that unlike the National Insurance Board 
herein four of the seven board members are from government agencies. Moreover, the 
chairman of the board is appointed by the President with recommendation from the Minister 
responsible for finance.255 In reality this means that the majority of the board members will 
be pursuing the interests of the government and will indeed have an influence on the 
regulatory and supervisory agenda.  This is an interesting realisation when one takes into 
account that the Silos Model has been seen as one that retains a greater level of political 
independence.256 Herein, the authority appears to be merely an extension of the government 
and will undoubtedly be subject to political influence. 
Although the Silos Model does work, its appears, through the Tanzanian example and the 
examination of the previous models that it would probably be in its best interest to adopt a 
more accommodative model like the Unification Model or the Twin Peaks Model. 
4.6 Conclusion 
The Silos Model presents a lot of practical challenges when one imagines its tenets being 
extended to a regional context. Firstly, its legal structure doesn’t effectively change the 
current dynamic as far as numbers are concerned. It will still require at least three regulators 
for the regional structure to work. This presents a problem for financial conglomerates 
wishing to extend their services into SADC. One of the core reasons advanced for the 
development of the regional regulatory and supervisory authority is in pursuit of regional 
integration and a deeper and easier way for investors to have access to the entire SADC 
market. It is hard to imagine a scenario where a silos style regional regulator will attract 
investors wishing to drink from the wells that the emerging SADC economies have to offer. 
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 See Capital Markets and Securities Authority website accessed 18 April 2015 at http://www.cmsa-
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If anything, the model could lead to excessive regulatory arbitrage where financial 
conglomerates exploit the idea of a regional regulator and divert their trading activities to a 
sector with more relaxed rules.  
Independence 
The above discussion has shown that being isolated doesn’t necessarily mean being 
independent. The mere fact that different agencies regulate different industries of the 
financial sector should not be seen to suggest that such sectors are therefore independent. 
This is clearly shown in the Tanzanian Regulatory Authority when compared to the Capital 
Markets and Securities Authority. Whereas one appears to be a mere extension of the 
government arm and therefore susceptible to extensive political influence, the other has a 
balanced approach represented by the members of the government together with all relevant 
stakeholders in the industry. 
When talking about the Silos Model, the issue of independence is two-dimensional, the 
independence from political interference as discussed above and the independence of the 
regulatory and supervisory authorities from each other. The former kind of independence 
may be good whereas the latter may lead to a fragmented and disjointed and can be 
detrimental to the functioning of a well oiled financial sector. It would be difficult to advance 
this form of regulatory structure to a market like SADC that has a growing rate of financial 
conglomerates. 
Accountability 
Since the idea is to have independent agencies addressing the different aspects of the 
financial sector, no in-built check and balances system effectively operates in this model. The 
insurance authority may carry on its business to the best of its ability regardless of what 
endeavours the capital and securities market has in place.  This is unlike the twin peaks 
system where the peaks are legally obliges to cooperate, coordinate and improve 
accountability. 
All in all the Silos Model is not an attractive model for the SADC regional regulator. Its 
disjointed nature, susceptibility to regulatory arbitrage and inability to effectively regulate 
and supervise financial conglomerates are its biggest flaws. The next chapter deals with the 
proposed SADC Triple Peaks Model being the author’s idea of the best model for SADC. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE SADC TRIPLE PEAKS MODEL 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
From the discussions in the previous chapters it is common cause that all the different models 
have both positive and negative characteristics. For example, whereas the Unification Model 
is praised for its regulatory flexibility257, it overlooks the importance of conduct of business 
as a separate and distinct regulator and supervisor away from prudential aspects. The Twin 
Peaks then makes an attempt to remedy this by having two ‘peaks’ one focusing solely on 
prudential regulation, and the other on conduct of business258;  its shortcoming however, is 
that this often leads to a regulatory overlap.259 The Silos Model, which is to the author the 
least attractive, has issues of duplicity, inflexibility and regulatory arbitrage260 but does 
embody highly specialised regulation.261 
Ideally, one would recommend for SADC a hybrid-model that captures all positive features 
of the previously discussed models and minimises the disadvantages. This is however simply 
impractical. The question therefore is which permutation or combination of the various 
models is realistically best for SADC?  It would be ignorant for one to propose a model or a 
manner of financial regulation and supervision in a regional trading community without 
embracing and building on the models in place in the various countries and the existing 
structures at the regional level. 
Simply, the research doesn’t propose a ‘SADC model’ of financial regulation and supervision 
in a vacuum. It takes into account the various regulatory regimes in the respective countries 
and the achievements and failures of regional integration pursuits in SADC at the regional 
level. Secondly, the author seeks to propose a model that best suits SADC’s current 
                                                            
257
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institutional structure and enforceability mechanisms.262 It would be a research in vain if one 
proposes a model that is practically unenforceable and theoretically unattainable within the 
existing structures of SADC.263 It has already been highlighted that one of the biggest 
challenges in SADC is its institutional framework which was not properly amended when 
SADC transformed from Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) 
to SADC and this has become a big hurdle in the regional integration drive.264  In fact, one 
scholar categorically states that the transformation of SADC from SADCC was merely the 
dropping of the ‘C’ and didn’t involve the institutional shift that is required in pursuit of 
SADC’s new and refined mandate.265 
Although one is tempted to propose that SADC Member States adopt a legally enforceable 
structure that catalyses regional economic integration including the smooth introduction of a 
regional and supervisory agency, this has been the call by academics for many years and 
therefore such recommendation on its own will not in any way benefit present day SADC and 
current institutional framework. The author’s wish is to propose a model of financial services 
regulation and supervision that not only works within the current deficient structures of 
SADC but one that will seamlessly function even when SADC ultimately adopts more 
tangible and legally enforceable measures.  
Consequently, the key is to build on the existing efforts by stakeholders in the drive to 
regional economic integration. It must be emphasised that no model is necessarily better than 
the other but the adoption of the various models by the SADC countries has sprung from the 
facts and circumstances of each state.266 In order to fully comprehend the reasons and the 
nature of the proposed model, it is vital to briefly outline SADC’s history and institutional or 
rule-making structure together with current efforts geared at regional integration of financial 
services regulation and supervision in SADC. 
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 Van Nieuwkerk A ‘Regionalism into Glabalism? War into Peace? SADC and ECOWAS compared’ 2001 10(2) 
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5.2 From SADCC to SADC: Defect at Birth 
 SADCC was formed in 1980 through the Lusaka Declaration from the cooperation of what 
was then known as the Frontline States (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe) with the sole purpose of reducing reliance on apartheid South Africa 
who was their major trading partner.267 SADCC was therefore conceived as an ‘economic 
pillar of the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggle in the region.’268 
Since birth, SADCC states deliberately eschewed from the idea of a supra-national entity and 
therefore the ceding of sovereignty to this newly formed organisation was not on the 
agenda.269  It is perhaps the reason why to-date SADC has challenges in making and adopting 
enforceable rules in many areas including integration of financial services supervision. 
 SADCC’s second constitutive document, July 1981 Memorandum of Understanding in 
Harare, Zimbabwe recognised the Summit as the highest body and the one responsible for all 
the ‘binding decision making’, it was assisted by the Council of Ministers and the Standing 
Committee of Officials. A secretariat was also set up in Gaborone, Botswana but it has been 
said that ‘the small secretariat in Gaborone had neither the institutional capacity, nor the legal 
powers, to compel under-performing states to improve.’270 
When SADCC was ultimately transformed to SADC through the 1992 SADC Declaration in 
Windhoek Namibia, the bulk of the institutional structure remained the same.271 As such 
SADC still lacks supra-nationality as a characteristic to its operations. All the decisions 
decided at the summit are to be implemented at the national level through the work of the 
SADC National Committees.272  Even so, the National Committees do not impose any 
obligations on   sovereign states and rules of international law on the application of treaties 
and conventions must still be followed. 
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In the end it is gathered that the SADC institutional framework was not properly revisited 
when the 1992 transformation took place from SADCC to SADC. As such SADC’s lack of 
supra-nationality continues to present a hiccup in the effective implementation of regional 
integration endeavours. 
5.3 Building Blocks: Regional Integration efforts thus far 
As already highlighted above, the SADC model is not proposed in a vacuum. As such, one is 
tasked with examining the current efforts towards regional integration of financial services 
regulation before attempting to flesh them out substantively in the form of a well-structured 
financial services regulatory model suitable for SADC. 
5.3.1 SADC Committee of Central Bank Governors  
The SADC Committee of Central Bank Governors (CCBG) was created in July 1995 with the 
support from SADC Ministers responsible for national financial matters .It was subsequently 
approved by the SADC Council at their meeting in August 1995.273  The main reason for the 
establishment of this committee was the need for a specialised body in SADC to be 
responsible for the promotion, coordination and monitoring of the macroeconomic 
convergence criteria set by SADC.274  Macroeconomic convergence refers to the idea 
forming the bedrock of this research being the deepening integration levels sought by SADC 
to ultimately form a monetary union.275  
The SADC CCGB coordinates and cooperates in various aspects of general central bank 
functions such as monitoring inflation, interest rates, general intra-SADC trade and economic 
growth in the region basing such on the set targets of macroeconomic convergence by 
2018.276 The inflation rate as an example has been set at 3 per cent. 
Within the structures of the SADC CCBG emerges the subcommittee on banking supervisors 
tasked specifically with ensuring sound and well-managed banking institutions in the region 
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including the facilitation of harmonised regulation and supervision.277  The subcommittee on 
banking supervision is therefore a subset of the general CCGB. However, unlike the CCBG 
which is chaired and housed in South Africa through their reserve bank, it is chaired in 
Mauritius.  The subcommittee has set into motion the idea of harmonised banking regulation 
and supervision in the region and has continued to publish country reports on the status and 
implementation of both International Accounting Standards (IAS) and Basel I, II and III 
requirements to ensure that principles of regulation and supervision in the banks gradually 
become harmonised.278 
This is a noteworthy achievement and one can concede that the very existence of the 
subcommittee coupled with the work it has undertaken is a valuable indication of SADC’s 
dedication towards the harmonisation of financial services regulation and supervision in the 
banking sector. 
5.3.2 SADC Committee of Insurance, Securities and Non-Banking Financial Authorities 
Whereas the SADC CCBG deals with the banking sector, SADC Committee of Insurance, 
Securities, and Non-Banking Financial Authorities (CISNA) with its self-explanatory name 
deals with Capital Markets, Collective Investment Schemes, Insurance companies, 
Retirement funds and providers of intermediary services in the SADC.279 It was established in 
1998 pursuant to Article 2 of Annex 10 of SADC’s Finance and Investment Protocol.   
CISNA aims to facilitate the harmonisation of risk based regulatory framework for the SADC 
member states in the identified areas. CISNA also strives to address matters like market 
infrastructure and liquidity of capital markets which act as a catalyst s for greater 
participation of local and foreign investors in the SADC region.280 
In October 2001, 23 national authorities within SADC signed a CISNA multilateral 
memorandum of understanding (MMoU) setting into motion its regional integration 
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cooperative endeavours.281  In October 2003 during a meeting of relevant stakeholders in 
Angola prospects of another MMoU were discussed, analysed and a general consensus 
existed leading to another MMoU being ultimately signed in Mauritius in April 2004.282 The 
restructuring and renewal of CISNA’s MMoU is an indication of its growth and proper 
alignment of its role within the SADC structures. Under the said MMoU the signatories agree 
to cooperate, share and assist each other to the fullest extent as permissible under their 
respective laws.283 
One of CISNA’s noteworthy achievements is its input and contribution given while assisting 
the Financial Sector Coordinating Unit in the preparation of the SADC FIP.284 For its 
shortcomings, it has seen as lacking adequate resources at both the national and regional level 
leading to a slow reform mechanism.285 
5.4 What is the SADC Triple Peaks Model? 
As can be discerned from the above discussion the current regional integration efforts in 
financial services regulation in SADC are along the partial Unification Model. This can be 
seen by how the regulatory agencies have aligned themselves along the banking (with the 
CCBG) and insurance, securities and non-banking financial authorities (with CISNA). 
Therefore the building blocks or foundations in place are along the lines of the partial 
Unification Model evidenced by the Botswana case study. 
In light of this and in an attempt to enhance the existing efforts the author proposes a Triple 
Peaks Model as the suitable model for SADC’s regional financial services regulator and 
supervisor. This is a hybrid of the Unification Model and the Twin Peaks Model. The idea is 
to retain and strengthen the existing committees and ultimately transform them into regional 
regulatory and supervisory authorities for banking and non-banking financial activities. 
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Thereafter, the author proposes a third peak for conduct of business. This peak should be 
formed in the same way that the CCBG and CISNA were formed, with the same 
considerations and regard and the ultimate approval by the SADC Council. 
The CCBG will be not only a fully fleshed banking regulator and supervisor but also the 
prudential peak ensuring systemic stability and the overall welfare of the financial system in 
the region. As has already been highlighted in Chapter 3 with the Twin Peaks discussion, it 
has been advised that the prudential peak be kept with the central bank in emerging 
economies.286 This recommendation is ideal for SADC because except South Africa, all other 
member states are transforming economies which fall squarely within the ambit of the 
recommendation. The classification is also apparent in international trade law terms where, 
with the exclusion of South Africa, all the other SADC Member States fall under the 
classification of developing or least-developed countries.287 The subcommittee on banking 
supervision will naturally continue to direct its activities in the pursuit of banking 
supervision. 
The proposed SADC Triple Peaks also introduces the vital third conduct of business peak. 
The importance of conduct of business as a stand-alone pillar was thoroughly discussed in the 
Twin Peaks Model captured in Chapter 3 and will only be briefly outlined herein for 
emphasis. Conduct of business focuses on consumer protection issues within the financial 
services sector that are admittedly not adequately addressed by ordinary consumer protection 
laws.288 It is vital that both prudential regulation and conduct of business issues a properly 
protected in every regulatory structure as the neglect of one can be calamitous.289  
The three regulatory authorities will be required to religiously use the SADC Finance and 
Investment Protocol as their blueprint in the formulation and implementation of any 
regulatory and supervisory standards. One author examining Malawian regulatory and 
supervisory regime brilliantly pointed out the financial sector regulatory and supervisory 
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287
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288
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61 where he discusses how the United Kingdom Unification Model had compromised prudential regulation to 
its detriment as can be seen  through the effects of the 2008 global financial crisis. UK ultimately adopted Twin 
Peaks. 
 
 
 
 
 P
a
g
e
7
2
 
reforms in Malawi had failed to take into account the vision and spirit of the SADC Finance 
and Investment Protocol and as such had not enhanced SADC’s regional integration 
pursuit.290  
The adoption of the SADC Finance and Investment Protocol as the regional blueprint is not 
only important because it holds the best account of SADC’s plans to regionally integrate, it is 
also a accepted as a legal basis that all SADC Member States have agreed to and therefore its 
application will also have the benefit of overcoming to some extent the institutional 
framework challenge for the SADC Triple Peaks.291 
It is crucial for one to pause here and explain exactly what the idea of a legally enforceable 
document in community law such as SADC is. Using regional economic integration as the 
bedrock, the SADC Finance and Investment protocol of 2006 encapsulates the ideas, notions 
and goals that SADC’s finance and investment sectors aims to achieve collectively as a 
regional economic unit.292 At a cursory glance it embodies five crucial phases of regional 
integration starting with member states preparing for integration by modernising and 
upgrading their financial and investment regimes and ends with ultimate unification and the 
idea of a single monetary union.293  
In relation to financial services regulation and supervision the reading of the Protocol should 
be done together with a close examination of Annex 5, Annex8, and Annex 10 which are all 
an integral part of the Protocol.294 Annex 5 deals specifically with the harmonisation of legal 
and operational frameworks whereas Annex 8 and 10 outline cooperation and coordination in 
the area of banking regulation and supervisory matters and cooperation on non-banking 
financial institutions and services respectively. 
The next crucial questions are; what is the value of this eloquently drafted Protocol in real 
terms? What is the intention of the author in suggesting that the SADC Finance and 
                                                            
290
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Investment Protocol be the blue print of the SADC Member States in the application of the 
proposed SADC Triple Peaks? These questions all go back to open Pandora’s box in the 
world of international law and its application in national legal systems.295 
Article 25 of the SADC Finance and Investment Protocol provides that parties shall take such 
appropriate measures to ensure that their obligations arising from the protocol are fulfilled. 
The applicability of this will vary depending on the legal regime present in a particular 
SADC state. Namibia for example has the monist position296 and therefore once an 
international instrument has been ratified it will have legal force in the country meanwhile 
Botswana with a dualist regime297 would have a two-staged approach of ratification and 
domestication through an act of Parliament before international law becomes enforceable in 
the country. Community law is part of the fabric of international law.298 
This doesn’t however diminish the value of the SADC Finance and Investment Protocol as a 
backbone and blueprint to the effective implementation of the SADC Triple Peaks. The 
SADC committees outlined above have already taken positive steps in the direction of 
turning the Protocol into a living document away from the challenges of the applicability of 
international law in national jurisdictions. Therefore, despite SADC’s lacking enforceability 
mechanisms through cooperation the committees continue to uphold the integrity of the 
institution. 
The SADC Triple Peaks merely adds on this by suggesting that the existing committees 
gradually culminate into regional authorities and that a conduct of business authority driven 
by the same dedication must be conceived. As seen with the other peaks, conduct of business 
will first have to become a committee before it can mature into an authority. It is further 
proposed that the conduct of business committee be temporarily housed and chaired in the 
South African conduct of business authority (Financial Sector Conduct Authority)  being the 
only SADC Member state with the Twin Peaks (once established) in order to learn the rules 
of the game. 
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5.5 Advantages of the SADC Triple Peaks 
Since the SADC Triple Peak Model embodies essentially both the Unification Model 
(although partial unification) and the Twin Peaks Model ideally all advantages under both 
regulatory and supervisory regimes should be in the Triple Peaks Model. Fortunately, unlike 
with the Silos Model and the Unification Model no major clashes exist between the two 
regulatory regimes. Since a full discussion is given on both the Unification Model and Twin 
Peaks Model in Chapter 2 and 3 respectively, a few crucial advantages a discussed below. 
5.5.1 Financial conglomerates and Competitive Neutrality 
The growth of financial conglomerates in SADC is not in dispute, in fact, it is a welcomed 
development since these multinationals not only invest in the region but open up the region to 
other parts of the world. The SADC Triple Peaks’ hybrid nature embraces this new 
development. The unification aspect enables it to cater for financial conglomerates that cut 
across the financial sectors, the twin peaks angle on the other hand ensures that the 
companies setting up meet the required standards for the overall health of the financial sector 
(prudential peak in CCGB) and that the citizens of SADC are not exploited by the new often 
deceiving product offered in big financial conglomerates (conduct of business peak).  
The advantage of competitive neutrality emanates from the Unification Model however at a 
regional level this benefit is heightened. It tries to address the idea that financial institutions 
offering the same or similar products can sometimes be regulated differently.299 Through the 
SADC Triple Peaks, the investor is assured that in the SADC region no such unfair advantage 
can exist. A financial institution in Botswana will not have a ‘regulatory’ advantage over one 
setting up in Madagascar. The SADC Triple Peaks will ensure this neutrality. 
5.5.2 Regulatory Flexibility 
The SADC Triple Peaks has great flexibility which is beneficial to its emerging economies. It 
goes without saying that the financial services being provided will continue to evolve into 
others that cannot be conceived today.  It is pertinent that a regional regulator and supervisor 
should be able to respond to these changing conditions with ease. 
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The SADC region also has ‘unique’ financial services (such as the mobile money) that do not 
fall into the conventional traditional sectors and therefore it is good that a certain level of 
flexibility is maintained in its regulatory structures.300 
5.6 Disadvantages of the SADC Triple Peaks 
Similarly, the main disadvantages to the two models forming the hybrid SADC Triple Peaks 
have been discussed extensively in their respective chapters, the aim herein is to bring to the 
fore any disadvantages unique to the SADC Triple Peaks or any that need emphasis. 
5.6.1 Slow and Gradual Application 
Supporters of regional economic integration agree that a mere leap into regional integration 
without ensuring that all the necessary mechanisms are in place can lead to a calamity.301 In 
light of SADC’s institutional structure and implementation deficit as discussed above, the 
formation of a regulator and supervisor of this magnitude is going to be a very slow process. 
Unfortunately, the global village moves at a much swifter pace and the benefits of the 
harmonised regulatory regime may not be felt in SADC for many years to come. The efforts 
by the CCGB and CISNA are however still very commendable. 
5.6.2 Lack of Supra-Nationality 
A regional financial services regulator and supervisor born from an organisation without 
supra-nationality cannot be bestowed with such power. The SADC Triple Peaks will 
therefore continue to be the work of cooperative measures by the SADC states through the 
committees and the SADC National Committees.  
If however, the work of these committees continues on the right tangent, their strong 
recommendations will ultimately weave their way into the fabrics of the laws belonging to 
the SADC Member States. Through the work of the SADC Triple Peaks any subsequently 
promulgated banking laws or insurance laws or amendments to the same will strive to follow 
the Finance and Investment Protocol as the blue print and ultimately become harmonised in 
the entire region. 
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5.6.3 Burden on South Africa 
The Frontline States formed SADCC to try and exclude South Africa; it is with the greatest 
irony that South Africa has become the big brother to all SADC states. South Africa is the 
only country in SADC with the Twin Peaks and it is on such basis that it is suggested that the 
conduct authority should also be housed in its jurisdiction. This can however be burdensome 
on a state that is itself undergoing transformation to its financial sector regulatory and 
supervisory regime. South Africa may therefore be hesitant to take another responsibility 
over and above the CCGB. This may delay the establishment of the conduct authority and 
hinder the SADC Triple Peaks. Although not completely advisable, in the interests of 
progress another SADC member may undertake this responsibility. 
5.7 Conclusion 
Despite the challenges that the SADC Triple Peaks has, the author strongly believes that this 
model will benefit SADC’s regional integration efforts in financial services regulation and 
supervision. 
The model embraces SADC’s existing efforts and builds on the cooperation and coordination 
that the Member States have. Like any proposal, the SADC Triple Peaks has its weaknesses 
but the author strongly believes that its benefits far outweigh its weaknesses and it will be in 
the best interests of the regional community to consider the application of this regulatory 
mechanism. 
The SADC Triple Peaks is a reflection of the two favourable models discussed in this study. 
It has a true appreciation of all the essential requirements that any regulatory and supervisory 
authority in a region that is a part of a civilised comity of states should have. Moreover, the 
Triple Peaks embodies the Twin Peaks which has been adopted by SADC’s big brother South 
Africa; it will hopefully have the support of this nation and assist the other SADC states to be 
inclined to embrace it. 
Lastly, the SADC Triple Peaks strives to advance the underlying reasons for economic 
theory: to constrain the use of monopoly and prevent serious distortions to competition in the 
region; through its prudential peak it maintains market integrity; and through its conduct of 
business peak it safeguards the needs of ordinary people. 
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